npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-SkillsMITRE ATT&CK
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- Assessing mobile app backend API authentication during penetration tests
- Testing JWT token implementation for common vulnerabilities (none algorithm, weak signing)
- Evaluating OAuth 2.0 / OIDC flows in mobile applications for redirect, PKCE, and scope issues
- Testing for broken object-level authorization (BOLA/IDOR) in API endpoints
Do not use this skill against production APIs without explicit authorization and rate-limiting awareness.
Prerequisites
- Burp Suite or mitmproxy configured as mobile device proxy
- SSL pinning bypassed on target application (if implemented)
- Valid test account credentials for the target application
- Postman or curl for API request crafting
- jwt.io or PyJWT for JWT analysis and manipulation
Workflow
Step 1: Map Authentication Endpoints
Intercept mobile app traffic to identify authentication-related endpoints:
POST /api/v1/auth/login - Initial authentication
POST /api/v1/auth/register - Account registration
POST /api/v1/auth/refresh - Token refresh
POST /api/v1/auth/logout - Session termination
POST /api/v1/auth/forgot-password - Password reset
POST /api/v1/auth/verify-otp - OTP verification
GET /api/v1/auth/me - Authenticated user profileStep 2: Analyze Token Format and Security
JWT Analysis:
# Decode JWT without verification
echo "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs..." | cut -d. -f2 | base64 -d 2>/dev/null
# Check for common JWT vulnerabilities:
# 1. None algorithm attack
# Change header to: {"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}
# Remove signature: header.payload.
# 2. Algorithm confusion (RS256 to HS256)
# If server uses RS256, try HS256 with public key as secret
# 3. Weak signing key
# Use hashcat or jwt-cracker to brute-force HMAC secret
hashcat -m 16500 jwt.txt wordlist.txt
# 4. Expiration bypass
# Modify "exp" claim to future timestampOpaque Token Analysis:
- Test token length and entropy
- Check if tokens are sequential/predictable
- Test token reuse after logout
- Verify token invalidation on password changeStep 3: Test Authentication Bypass
# Test missing authentication
curl -X GET https://api.target.com/api/v1/users/profile
# Test with empty/null token
curl -X GET https://api.target.com/api/v1/users/profile \
-H "Authorization: Bearer "
curl -X GET https://api.target.com/api/v1/users/profile \
-H "Authorization: Bearer null"
# Test with expired token (should fail)
curl -X GET https://api.target.com/api/v1/users/profile \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <expired_token>"
# Test token from different user
curl -X GET https://api.target.com/api/v1/users/123/profile \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <user_456_token>"Step 4: Test IDOR / Broken Object-Level Authorization
# Change user ID in request path
curl -X GET https://api.target.com/api/v1/users/123/orders \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <user_456_token>"
# Change object ID in request body
curl -X PUT https://api.target.com/api/v1/orders/789 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <user_456_token>" \
-d '{"status": "cancelled"}'
# Test horizontal privilege escalation
# Access admin endpoints with regular user token
curl -X GET https://api.target.com/api/v1/admin/users \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <regular_user_token>"Step 5: Test Session Management
# Test concurrent sessions
# Login from multiple devices simultaneously - should both remain valid?
# Test session invalidation after logout
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST https://api.target.com/api/v1/auth/login \
-d '{"email":"test@test.com","password":"pass"}' | jq -r '.token')
# Logout
curl -X POST https://api.target.com/api/v1/auth/logout \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Try using the same token (should fail)
curl -X GET https://api.target.com/api/v1/users/me \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Test session invalidation after password change
# Token obtained before password change should be invalidatedStep 6: Test OAuth 2.0 / OIDC Mobile Flows
# Test for authorization code interception
# Check if PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) is enforced
# Test with missing code_verifier parameter
# Test redirect URI manipulation
# Try custom scheme hijacking: myapp://callback
# Test with modified redirect_uri parameter
# Test scope escalation
# Request higher privileges than grantedKey Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| BOLA/IDOR | Broken Object Level Authorization - accessing resources by changing identifiers without server-side authorization checks |
| JWT | JSON Web Token - self-contained authentication token with header, payload, and signature components |
| PKCE | Proof Key for Code Exchange - OAuth 2.0 extension preventing authorization code interception in mobile apps |
| Token Refresh | Mechanism for obtaining new access tokens using long-lived refresh tokens without re-authentication |
| Session Fixation | Attack where adversary sets a known session ID before victim authenticates, then hijacks the session |
Tools & Systems
- Burp Suite: HTTP proxy for intercepting and modifying authentication requests
- jwt_tool: Python tool for testing JWT vulnerabilities (none algorithm, key confusion, claim manipulation)
- Postman: API testing client for crafting authentication requests
- hashcat: Password/JWT secret cracking tool for testing HMAC signing key strength
- Autorize: Burp Suite extension for automated authorization testing
Common Pitfalls
- Rate limiting masks issues: API may rate-limit test requests. Use delays between requests and test from the tester's authorized perspective first.
- Token in URL: Some mobile APIs pass tokens in URL query parameters, exposing them in server logs and browser history. Flag as finding even if authorization works correctly.
- Refresh token rotation: Some APIs rotate refresh tokens on each use. If your test invalidates the refresh token, you may lock out your test account.
- Mobile-specific OAuth: Mobile apps use custom URI schemes for OAuth redirects, which can be intercepted by malicious apps registered for the same scheme.
References and resources
Everything below is rendered for inspection. Script files are read-only and never run.
References 3
api-reference.md1.8 KB
API Reference: Testing Mobile API Authentication
Common Mobile Auth Endpoints
| Endpoint | Method | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| /api/v1/login | POST | Username/password authentication |
| /api/v1/register | POST | New account creation |
| /api/v1/token | POST | OAuth token exchange |
| /api/v1/refresh | POST | Token refresh flow |
| /api/v1/logout | POST | Session termination |
| /api/v1/verify-otp | POST | MFA code verification |
| /api/v1/me | GET | Current user profile |
Mobile-Specific JWT Claims
| Claim | Purpose | Security Impact |
|---|---|---|
| device_id / did | Bind token to device | Prevents token theft across devices |
| platform | iOS/Android identifier | Enables platform-specific policy |
| app_version | Client version tracking | Version-gated feature access |
| exp | Token expiration | Missing = permanent access |
Test Categories
| Test | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|
| No auth access | Critical | Endpoints accessible without token |
| IDOR | Critical | Access other users' resources |
| Weak JWT secret | Critical | Brute-force HMAC signing key |
| Token reuse after logout | High | Token valid after logout |
| No rate limiting | High | Unlimited login attempts |
| Missing device binding | Medium | Token works on any device |
Python Libraries
| Library | Version | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
requests |
>=2.28 | HTTP API testing |
base64 |
stdlib | JWT decoding |
hmac |
stdlib | HMAC signature verification |
hashlib |
stdlib | Hash functions for JWT |
References
- OWASP Mobile Top 10: https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-top-10/
- OWASP API Security Top 10: https://owasp.org/API-Security/
- MASVS Authentication: https://mas.owasp.org/MASVS/05-MASVS-AUTH/
standards.md1.4 KB
Standards Reference: Mobile API Authentication Testing
OWASP Mobile Top 10 2024
| OWASP ID | Risk | Testing Focus |
|---|---|---|
| M1 | Improper Credential Usage | Hardcoded API keys, credential transmission |
| M3 | Insecure Authentication/Authorization | Auth bypass, IDOR, privilege escalation |
OWASP API Security Top 10 2023
| API Risk | Test Case |
|---|---|
| API1: Broken Object Level Authorization | Modify object IDs, test cross-user access |
| API2: Broken Authentication | JWT vulnerabilities, token replay, session management |
| API3: Broken Object Property Level Auth | Mass assignment, property-level access |
| API5: Broken Function Level Authorization | Admin endpoint access with user tokens |
OWASP MASVS v2.0 - MASVS-AUTH
| Control | Test Method |
|---|---|
| MASVS-AUTH-1 | Verify authentication enforcement on all sensitive endpoints |
| MASVS-AUTH-2 | Test token generation, validation, and revocation |
| MASVS-AUTH-3 | Assess multi-factor authentication implementation |
CWE Mappings
| CWE | Title | Test |
|---|---|---|
| CWE-287 | Improper Authentication | Missing auth on endpoints |
| CWE-639 | Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key | IDOR testing |
| CWE-798 | Hardcoded Credentials | API key in APK/IPA |
| CWE-613 | Insufficient Session Expiration | Token lifetime testing |
| CWE-384 | Session Fixation | Pre-auth token reuse |
workflows.md1.5 KB
Workflows: Mobile API Authentication Testing
Workflow 1: Authentication Assessment
[Intercept traffic] --> [Map auth endpoints] --> [Analyze token format]
|
+-------------+-------------+
| | |
[JWT analysis] [OAuth flow] [Session mgmt]
[None alg] [PKCE check] [Expiration]
[Key brute] [Redirect URI] [Logout invalidation]
| | |
+-------------+-------------+
|
[IDOR testing]
[Privilege escalation]
[Report findings]Decision Matrix: Token Vulnerability Testing
| Token Type | Primary Tests | Tools |
|---|---|---|
| JWT (HS256) | Key brute force, none algorithm, claim manipulation | jwt_tool, hashcat |
| JWT (RS256) | Algorithm confusion, public key retrieval, key ID manipulation | jwt_tool |
| Opaque | Entropy analysis, predictability, server-side invalidation | Burp Sequencer |
| OAuth Bearer | Scope escalation, redirect URI manipulation, PKCE enforcement | Burp, Postman |
Scripts 2
agent.py7.9 KB
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Agent for testing mobile API authentication security.
Tests mobile app backend APIs for broken authentication, insecure
token management, session fixation, privilege escalation, and
IDOR vulnerabilities using intercepted traffic analysis.
"""
import json
import base64
import hashlib
import hmac
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from datetime import datetime
try:
import requests
except ImportError:
requests = None
AUTH_ENDPOINTS = [
"/api/v1/login", "/api/v1/register", "/api/v1/token",
"/api/v1/refresh", "/api/v1/logout", "/api/v1/forgot-password",
"/api/v1/reset-password", "/api/v1/verify-otp", "/api/v1/me",
"/api/v2/auth/login", "/auth/token", "/oauth/token",
]
WEAK_SECRETS = [
"secret", "password", "123456", "mobile_secret", "app_secret",
"changeme", "default", "your-256-bit-secret", "s3cr3t",
]
class MobileAPIAuthAgent:
"""Tests mobile API authentication mechanisms."""
def __init__(self, base_url, output_dir="./mobile_api_auth_test"):
self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
self.output_dir = Path(output_dir)
self.output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self.findings = []
def _req(self, method, path, **kwargs):
if not requests:
return None
kwargs.setdefault("timeout", 10)
try:
return requests.request(method, f"{self.base_url}{path}", **kwargs)
except requests.RequestException:
return None
def discover_auth_endpoints(self):
"""Probe common mobile auth endpoints."""
found = []
for ep in AUTH_ENDPOINTS:
resp = self._req("OPTIONS", ep)
if resp and resp.status_code != 404:
found.append({"endpoint": ep, "status": resp.status_code,
"methods": resp.headers.get("Allow", "")})
return found
def test_no_auth_access(self, endpoints=None):
"""Test endpoints without authentication token."""
targets = endpoints or ["/api/v1/me", "/api/v1/users", "/api/v1/orders",
"/api/v1/settings", "/api/v1/notifications"]
results = []
for ep in targets:
resp = self._req("GET", ep)
if resp and resp.status_code == 200:
results.append({"endpoint": ep, "status": 200, "body_len": len(resp.text)})
self.findings.append({"severity": "critical", "type": "No Auth Required",
"detail": f"{ep} accessible without token"})
return results
def decode_jwt(self, token):
parts = token.split(".")
if len(parts) != 3:
return None, None
def pad(s): return s + "=" * (4 - len(s) % 4)
try:
header = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(pad(parts[0])))
payload = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(pad(parts[1])))
return header, payload
except Exception:
return None, None
def analyze_token(self, token):
"""Analyze JWT for mobile-specific weaknesses."""
header, payload = self.decode_jwt(token)
if not header:
return {"error": "Invalid token"}
issues = []
if header.get("alg") == "none":
issues.append({"severity": "critical", "issue": "alg:none - no signature"})
if "exp" not in payload:
issues.append({"severity": "high", "issue": "No expiration - token lives forever"})
if "device_id" not in payload and "did" not in payload:
issues.append({"severity": "medium", "issue": "No device binding in token"})
if header.get("alg", "").startswith("HS"):
issues.append({"severity": "info", "issue": "Symmetric HMAC - test weak secrets"})
for i in issues:
self.findings.append({"severity": i["severity"], "type": "Token Analysis", "detail": i["issue"]})
return {"header": header, "payload": payload, "issues": issues}
def test_token_reuse_after_logout(self, token, logout_path="/api/v1/logout"):
"""Test if token remains valid after logout."""
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
self._req("POST", logout_path, headers=headers)
resp = self._req("GET", "/api/v1/me", headers=headers)
if resp and resp.status_code == 200:
self.findings.append({"severity": "high", "type": "Token Reuse After Logout",
"detail": "Token still valid after logout call"})
return {"reusable": True}
return {"reusable": False}
def test_rate_limiting(self, login_path="/api/v1/login", attempts=20):
"""Test brute-force protection on login endpoint."""
blocked = False
for i in range(attempts):
resp = self._req("POST", login_path, json={"username": "test", "password": f"wrong{i}"})
if resp and resp.status_code == 429:
blocked = True
break
if not blocked:
self.findings.append({"severity": "high", "type": "No Rate Limiting",
"detail": f"Login accepted {attempts} attempts without blocking"})
return {"rate_limited": blocked, "attempts": attempts}
def test_idor(self, token, resource_path="/api/v1/users/{id}", own_id="1", other_id="2"):
"""Test for IDOR by accessing another user's resource."""
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
own = self._req("GET", resource_path.format(id=own_id), headers=headers)
other = self._req("GET", resource_path.format(id=other_id), headers=headers)
if own and other and other.status_code == 200:
self.findings.append({"severity": "critical", "type": "IDOR",
"detail": f"User {own_id} can access user {other_id} data"})
return {"vulnerable": True}
return {"vulnerable": False}
def brute_force_jwt_secret(self, token):
"""Test for weak HMAC signing secrets."""
header, _ = self.decode_jwt(token)
if not header or header.get("alg") not in ("HS256", "HS384", "HS512"):
return None
parts = token.split(".")
signing_input = f"{parts[0]}.{parts[1]}".encode()
alg_map = {"HS256": hashlib.sha256, "HS384": hashlib.sha384, "HS512": hashlib.sha512}
h = alg_map[header["alg"]]
for secret in WEAK_SECRETS:
expected = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
hmac.new(secret.encode(), signing_input, h).digest()
).decode().rstrip("=")
if expected == parts[2]:
self.findings.append({"severity": "critical", "type": "Weak JWT Secret",
"detail": f"Secret cracked: '{secret}'"})
return secret
return None
def generate_report(self, token=None):
endpoints = self.discover_auth_endpoints()
no_auth = self.test_no_auth_access()
token_analysis = self.analyze_token(token) if token else None
secret = self.brute_force_jwt_secret(token) if token else None
report = {
"report_date": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
"target": self.base_url,
"auth_endpoints": endpoints,
"unauthenticated_access": no_auth,
"token_analysis": token_analysis,
"weak_secret": secret,
"findings": self.findings,
"total_findings": len(self.findings),
}
out = self.output_dir / "mobile_api_auth_report.json"
with open(out, "w") as f:
json.dump(report, f, indent=2)
print(json.dumps(report, indent=2))
return report
def main():
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print("Usage: agent.py <base_url> [--token <jwt>]")
sys.exit(1)
url = sys.argv[1]
token = None
if "--token" in sys.argv:
token = sys.argv[sys.argv.index("--token") + 1]
agent = MobileAPIAuthAgent(url)
agent.generate_report(token)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
process.py9.0 KB
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Mobile API Authentication Tester
Tests common authentication vulnerabilities in mobile API endpoints including
JWT analysis, IDOR detection, and session management assessment.
Usage:
python process.py --base-url https://api.target.com --token <JWT> [--output report.json]
"""
import argparse
import base64
import json
import os
import sys
import time
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
try:
import requests
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()
except ImportError:
print("ERROR: 'requests' required. Install: pip install requests")
sys.exit(1)
class MobileAPIAuthTester:
"""Tests mobile API authentication and authorization."""
def __init__(self, base_url: str, token: str):
self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
self.token = token
self.findings = []
self.session = requests.Session()
self.session.verify = not os.environ.get("SKIP_TLS_VERIFY", "").lower() == "true" # Set SKIP_TLS_VERIFY=true for self-signed certs in lab environments
self.session.headers.update({
"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
"User-Agent": "MobileSecurityTester/1.0",
})
def analyze_jwt(self) -> dict:
"""Analyze JWT token structure and identify vulnerabilities."""
parts = self.token.split(".")
if len(parts) != 3:
return {"is_jwt": False, "format": "opaque_or_invalid"}
try:
# Decode header
header_padded = parts[0] + "=" * (4 - len(parts[0]) % 4)
header = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(header_padded))
# Decode payload
payload_padded = parts[1] + "=" * (4 - len(parts[1]) % 4)
payload = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(payload_padded))
issues = []
# Check algorithm
alg = header.get("alg", "unknown")
if alg.lower() == "none":
issues.append({"issue": "none_algorithm", "severity": "CRITICAL"})
elif alg.lower() in ("hs256", "hs384", "hs512"):
issues.append({"issue": "hmac_algorithm_key_brute_forceable", "severity": "MEDIUM"})
# Check expiration
exp = payload.get("exp")
if not exp:
issues.append({"issue": "no_expiration_claim", "severity": "HIGH"})
elif exp < time.time():
issues.append({"issue": "token_already_expired", "severity": "INFO"})
elif exp - time.time() > 86400 * 7:
issues.append({"issue": "excessive_token_lifetime", "severity": "MEDIUM",
"details": f"Expires in {(exp - time.time()) / 86400:.0f} days"})
# Check for sensitive data in payload
sensitive_keys = ["password", "secret", "ssn", "credit_card"]
for key in payload:
if any(s in key.lower() for s in sensitive_keys):
issues.append({"issue": f"sensitive_data_in_jwt: {key}", "severity": "HIGH"})
# Check missing claims
if "iss" not in payload:
issues.append({"issue": "missing_issuer_claim", "severity": "LOW"})
if "iat" not in payload:
issues.append({"issue": "missing_issued_at_claim", "severity": "LOW"})
finding = {
"check": "jwt_analysis",
"is_jwt": True,
"algorithm": alg,
"claims": list(payload.keys()),
"issues": issues,
"severity": "HIGH" if any(i["severity"] in ("CRITICAL", "HIGH") for i in issues) else "MEDIUM",
}
self.findings.append(finding)
return finding
except Exception as e:
return {"is_jwt": True, "error": str(e)}
def test_missing_auth(self, endpoints: list) -> list:
"""Test endpoints without authentication."""
results = []
for endpoint in endpoints:
url = f"{self.base_url}{endpoint}"
try:
resp = requests.get(url, verify=not os.environ.get("SKIP_TLS_VERIFY", "").lower() == "true", timeout=10, # Set SKIP_TLS_VERIFY=true for self-signed certs in lab environments
headers={"User-Agent": "MobileSecurityTester/1.0"})
if resp.status_code != 401 and resp.status_code != 403:
result = {
"endpoint": endpoint,
"status": resp.status_code,
"issue": "accessible_without_auth",
"severity": "CRITICAL",
}
results.append(result)
except requests.RequestException:
pass
time.sleep(0.5) # Rate limiting
if results:
self.findings.append({
"check": "missing_authentication",
"owasp_api": "API2",
"endpoints_tested": len(endpoints),
"unprotected": len(results),
"details": results,
"severity": "CRITICAL",
})
return results
def test_expired_token(self) -> dict:
"""Test if expired tokens are accepted."""
# Create a JWT with expired timestamp (modifying payload)
parts = self.token.split(".")
if len(parts) != 3:
return {"check": "expired_token", "skipped": True}
try:
payload_padded = parts[1] + "=" * (4 - len(parts[1]) % 4)
payload = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(payload_padded))
if "exp" in payload and payload["exp"] < time.time():
# Token is already expired, test if it still works
resp = self.session.get(f"{self.base_url}/api/v1/users/me", timeout=10)
accepted = resp.status_code == 200
finding = {
"check": "expired_token_acceptance",
"token_expired": True,
"still_accepted": accepted,
"severity": "CRITICAL" if accepted else "PASS",
}
self.findings.append(finding)
return finding
except Exception:
pass
return {"check": "expired_token", "skipped": True, "reason": "token_not_expired"}
def test_idor(self, endpoint_template: str, valid_id: str, other_ids: list) -> list:
"""Test for IDOR by substituting object IDs."""
results = []
for other_id in other_ids:
url = f"{self.base_url}{endpoint_template.replace('{id}', other_id)}"
try:
resp = self.session.get(url, timeout=10)
if resp.status_code == 200:
results.append({
"endpoint": url,
"original_id": valid_id,
"tested_id": other_id,
"accessible": True,
"severity": "CRITICAL",
})
except requests.RequestException:
pass
time.sleep(0.5)
if results:
self.findings.append({
"check": "idor",
"owasp_api": "API1",
"vulnerable_endpoints": len(results),
"details": results,
"severity": "CRITICAL",
})
return results
def generate_report(self) -> dict:
"""Generate authentication test report."""
severity_counts = {}
for f in self.findings:
sev = f.get("severity", "INFO")
severity_counts[sev] = severity_counts.get(sev, 0) + 1
return {
"assessment": {
"target": self.base_url,
"type": "Mobile API Authentication Testing",
"date": datetime.now().isoformat(),
},
"summary": {
"total_checks": len(self.findings),
"severity_breakdown": severity_counts,
},
"findings": self.findings,
}
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Mobile API Authentication Tester")
parser.add_argument("--base-url", required=True, help="API base URL")
parser.add_argument("--token", required=True, help="Bearer token (JWT or opaque)")
parser.add_argument("--output", default="auth_test.json", help="Output report")
parser.add_argument("--endpoints", nargs="*", default=[
"/api/v1/users/me", "/api/v1/users", "/api/v1/admin",
], help="Endpoints to test")
args = parser.parse_args()
tester = MobileAPIAuthTester(args.base_url, args.token)
print("[*] Analyzing token...")
tester.analyze_jwt()
print("[*] Testing missing authentication...")
tester.test_missing_auth(args.endpoints)
print("[*] Testing expired token acceptance...")
tester.test_expired_token()
report = tester.generate_report()
with open(args.output, "w") as f:
json.dump(report, f, indent=2)
print(f"[+] Report saved: {args.output}")
print(f"[*] Findings: {report['summary']['severity_breakdown']}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()