npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-SkillsMITRE ATT&CK
When to Use
- When deploying Lambda functions or Azure Functions with access to sensitive data or cloud APIs
- When auditing existing serverless workloads for overly permissive IAM roles
- When integrating serverless functions into a DevSecOps pipeline with automated security scanning
- When hardcoded secrets or vulnerable dependencies are discovered in function code
- When establishing runtime monitoring for serverless workloads to detect injection or credential theft
Do not use for container-based compute security (see securing-kubernetes-on-cloud), for API Gateway configuration (see implementing-cloud-waf-rules), or for serverless architecture design decisions.
Prerequisites
- AWS Lambda, Azure Functions, or GCP Cloud Functions with deployment access
- CI/CD pipeline with dependency scanning tools (npm audit, Snyk, Dependabot)
- AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, or HashiCorp Vault for secrets management
- CloudWatch, Application Insights, or Cloud Logging for function monitoring
Workflow
Step 1: Enforce Least Privilege IAM Roles
Assign each Lambda function a dedicated IAM role with permissions scoped to only the specific resources it accesses. Never share IAM roles across functions.
# Create a least-privilege role for a specific Lambda function
aws iam create-role \
--role-name order-processor-lambda-role \
--assume-role-policy-document '{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {"Service": "lambda.amazonaws.com"},
"Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
}]
}'
# Attach a scoped policy (not AmazonDynamoDBFullAccess)
aws iam put-role-policy \
--role-name order-processor-lambda-role \
--policy-name order-processor-policy \
--policy-document '{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["dynamodb:PutItem", "dynamodb:GetItem"],
"Resource": "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:123456789012:table/Orders"
},
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["logs:CreateLogGroup", "logs:CreateLogStream", "logs:PutLogEvents"],
"Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:123456789012:log-group:/aws/lambda/order-processor:*"
},
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["secretsmanager:GetSecretValue"],
"Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:123456789012:secret:order-api-key-*"
}
]
}'Step 2: Eliminate Hardcoded Secrets
Replace plaintext credentials in environment variables with references to secrets management services. Use Lambda extensions or SDK calls to retrieve secrets at runtime.
# INSECURE: Hardcoded credentials in environment variable
# DB_PASSWORD = os.environ['DB_PASSWORD'] # Stored as plaintext in Lambda config
# SECURE: Retrieve from AWS Secrets Manager with caching
import boto3
from botocore.exceptions import ClientError
import json
_secret_cache = {}
def get_secret(secret_name):
if secret_name in _secret_cache:
return _secret_cache[secret_name]
client = boto3.client('secretsmanager')
response = client.get_secret_value(SecretId=secret_name)
secret = json.loads(response['SecretString'])
_secret_cache[secret_name] = secret
return secret
def lambda_handler(event, context):
db_creds = get_secret('production/database/credentials')
db_host = db_creds['host']
db_password = db_creds['password']
# Use credentials securely# Enable encryption at rest for Lambda environment variables
aws lambda update-function-configuration \
--function-name order-processor \
--kms-key-arn arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/key-idStep 3: Scan Dependencies for Vulnerabilities
Integrate automated dependency scanning into the CI/CD pipeline to catch vulnerable packages before deployment.
# npm audit for Node.js Lambda functions
cd lambda-function/
npm audit --audit-level=high
npm audit fix
# Snyk scanning in CI/CD pipeline
snyk test --severity-threshold=high
snyk monitor --project-name=order-processor-lambda
# pip-audit for Python Lambda functions
pip-audit -r requirements.txt --desc on --fix
# Scan Lambda deployment package with Trivy
trivy fs --severity HIGH,CRITICAL ./lambda-package/# GitHub Actions CI/CD security scanning
name: Lambda Security Scan
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
security:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
- name: Run npm audit
run: npm audit --audit-level=high
- name: Snyk vulnerability scan
uses: snyk/actions/node@master
env:
SNYK_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SNYK_TOKEN }}
- name: Scan with Semgrep for code vulnerabilities
uses: returntocorp/semgrep-action@v1
with:
config: p/owasp-top-tenStep 4: Implement Input Validation
Validate and sanitize all event input data to prevent injection attacks including SQL injection, command injection, and NoSQL injection through Lambda event sources.
import re
import json
from jsonschema import validate, ValidationError
# Define expected input schema
ORDER_SCHEMA = {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"orderId": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,36}$"},
"customerId": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,20}$"},
"amount": {"type": "number", "minimum": 0.01, "maximum": 999999.99},
"currency": {"type": "string", "enum": ["USD", "EUR", "GBP"]}
},
"required": ["orderId", "customerId", "amount", "currency"],
"additionalProperties": False
}
def lambda_handler(event, context):
# Validate API Gateway event body
try:
body = json.loads(event.get('body', '{}'))
validate(instance=body, schema=ORDER_SCHEMA)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValidationError) as e:
return {
'statusCode': 400,
'body': json.dumps({'error': 'Invalid input', 'details': str(e)})
}
# Safe to proceed with validated input
order_id = body['orderId']
# Use parameterized queries for database operationsStep 5: Configure Function URL and API Gateway Authentication
Secure function invocation endpoints with proper authentication. Never expose Lambda function URLs without IAM or Cognito authentication.
# Secure Lambda function URL with IAM auth (not NONE)
aws lambda create-function-url-config \
--function-name order-processor \
--auth-type AWS_IAM \
--cors '{
"AllowOrigins": ["https://app.company.com"],
"AllowMethods": ["POST"],
"AllowHeaders": ["Content-Type", "Authorization"],
"MaxAge": 3600
}'
# API Gateway with Cognito authorizer
aws apigateway create-authorizer \
--rest-api-id abc123 \
--name CognitoAuth \
--type COGNITO_USER_POOLS \
--provider-arns "arn:aws:cognito-idp:us-east-1:123456789012:userpool/us-east-1_EXAMPLE"Step 6: Enable Runtime Monitoring and Logging
Configure GuardDuty Lambda Network Activity Monitoring and CloudWatch structured logging to detect anomalous function behavior.
# Enable GuardDuty Lambda protection
aws guardduty update-detector \
--detector-id <detector-id> \
--features '[{"Name": "LAMBDA_NETWORK_ACTIVITY_LOGS", "Status": "ENABLED"}]'
# Configure Lambda to use structured logging
aws lambda update-function-configuration \
--function-name order-processor \
--logging-config '{"LogFormat": "JSON", "ApplicationLogLevel": "INFO", "SystemLogLevel": "WARN"}'Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Cold Start | Initial function invocation that includes container provisioning, increasing latency and creating a window where cached secrets may not be available |
| Event Injection | Attack where malicious input is embedded in Lambda event data from API Gateway, S3, SQS, or other event sources to exploit the function |
| Execution Role | IAM role assumed by Lambda during execution, defining all cloud API permissions the function can use |
| Function URL | Direct HTTPS endpoint for Lambda functions that can be configured with IAM or no authentication (NONE is insecure) |
| Layer | Lambda deployment package containing shared code or dependencies that should be scanned for vulnerabilities independently |
| Reserved Concurrency | Maximum number of concurrent executions for a function, useful for preventing resource exhaustion attacks |
| Provisioned Concurrency | Pre-initialized function instances that reduce cold start latency and ensure secrets are cached |
Tools & Systems
- AWS Lambda Power Tuning: Open-source tool for optimizing Lambda memory and timeout settings to balance security with performance
- Snyk: SCA tool scanning Lambda dependencies for known vulnerabilities with automatic fix suggestions
- Semgrep: SAST tool with serverless-specific rules detecting injection vulnerabilities, hardcoded secrets, and insecure configurations
- GuardDuty Lambda Protection: AWS service monitoring Lambda network activity for connections to malicious endpoints
- AWS X-Ray: Distributed tracing service for detecting suspicious external connections and latency anomalies in Lambda invocations
Common Scenarios
Scenario: SQL Injection via API Gateway to Lambda to RDS
Context: A Lambda function receives user input from API Gateway and constructs SQL queries by string concatenation against an RDS PostgreSQL database. An attacker injects SQL payloads through the API.
Approach:
- Audit the Lambda function code for string concatenation in SQL queries
- Replace all string-formatted queries with parameterized queries using the database driver
- Implement input validation using JSON Schema before any database operation
- Add a WAF rule on API Gateway to block common SQL injection patterns
- Deploy Semgrep in the CI/CD pipeline with the
python.django.security.injection.sqlrule set - Enable GuardDuty Lambda protection to detect anomalous database connection patterns
Pitfalls: Relying solely on WAF rules without fixing the underlying code vulnerability allows attackers to bypass with encoding tricks. Using ORM methods incorrectly (raw queries) still allows injection.
Output Format
Serverless Security Assessment Report
=======================================
Account: 123456789012
Functions Assessed: 47
Assessment Date: 2025-02-23
CRITICAL FINDINGS:
[SLS-001] order-processor: SQL injection via string concatenation
Language: Python 3.12 | Runtime: Lambda
Vulnerable Code: f"SELECT * FROM orders WHERE id = '{order_id}'"
Remediation: Use parameterized queries with psycopg2
[SLS-002] payment-handler: Hardcoded Stripe API key in environment variable
Key: sk_live_XXXX... (unencrypted)
Remediation: Migrate to AWS Secrets Manager with KMS encryption
HIGH FINDINGS:
[SLS-003] 12 functions share the same IAM execution role with s3:*
[SLS-004] 8 functions have function URLs with AuthType: NONE
[SLS-005] 23 functions have dependencies with known HIGH CVEs
DEPENDENCY VULNERABILITIES:
axios@0.21.1: CVE-2023-45857 (HIGH) - 5 functions affected
jsonwebtoken@8.5.1: CVE-2022-23529 (CRITICAL) - 3 functions affected
lodash@4.17.15: CVE-2021-23337 (HIGH) - 11 functions affected
SUMMARY:
Critical: 2 | High: 5 | Medium: 12 | Low: 8
Functions with Least Privilege: 14/47 (30%)
Functions with Secrets Manager: 19/47 (40%)
Functions with Input Validation: 22/47 (47%)References and resources
Everything below is rendered for inspection. Script files are read-only and never run.
References 1
api-reference.md2.1 KB
API Reference: Securing Serverless Functions
boto3 Lambda Client
Installation
pip install boto3Key Methods
| Method | Description |
|---|---|
list_functions() |
List all functions with configuration details |
get_function_configuration() |
Get function config (role, env vars, KMS) |
get_function_url_config() |
Get function URL and auth type |
get_function_concurrency() |
Get reserved concurrency settings |
update_function_configuration() |
Update KMS key, logging, VPC config |
create_function_url_config() |
Create function URL with auth type |
Function Configuration Fields
| Field | Security Relevance |
|---|---|
Role |
Execution role ARN (check for least privilege) |
Environment.Variables |
May contain hardcoded secrets |
KMSKeyArn |
Customer-managed KMS key for env encryption |
VpcConfig |
VPC subnet and security group configuration |
Timeout |
Max execution time (1-900 seconds) |
Runtime |
Language runtime (check for EOL versions) |
Layers |
Shared code layers (scan independently) |
Function URL Auth Types
| Value | Description |
|---|---|
AWS_IAM |
Requires IAM authentication (secure) |
NONE |
No authentication required (insecure for sensitive functions) |
boto3 IAM Client (Role Checks)
| Method | Description |
|---|---|
list_attached_role_policies() |
Check for overly broad managed policies |
get_role_policy() |
Inspect inline policy for wildcards |
get_role() |
Check trust policy and permission boundary |
GuardDuty Lambda Protection
gd = boto3.client("guardduty")
gd.update_detector(
DetectorId="<id>",
Features=[{"Name": "LAMBDA_NETWORK_ACTIVITY_LOGS", "Status": "ENABLED"}]
)References
- Lambda security best practices: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-security.html
- Lambda function URLs: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-urls.html
- GuardDuty Lambda protection: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/lambda-protection.html
Scripts 1
agent.py7.1 KB
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Agent for auditing serverless function security across AWS Lambda."""
import boto3
import json
import argparse
from datetime import datetime
def list_functions(region="us-east-1"):
"""List all Lambda functions with security-relevant configuration."""
lam = boto3.client("lambda", region_name=region)
functions = []
paginator = lam.get_paginator("list_functions")
for page in paginator.paginate():
for f in page["Functions"]:
functions.append({
"name": f["FunctionName"],
"runtime": f.get("Runtime", "N/A"),
"role": f["Role"].split("/")[-1],
"timeout": f.get("Timeout", 3),
"memory": f.get("MemorySize", 128),
"kms_key": f.get("KMSKeyArn", "None (default)"),
"vpc": bool(f.get("VpcConfig", {}).get("SubnetIds")),
})
print(f"[*] Found {len(functions)} Lambda functions")
for fn in functions:
print(f" {fn['name']} | {fn['runtime']} | role={fn['role']} | VPC={fn['vpc']}")
return functions
def check_function_urls(region="us-east-1"):
"""Check for Lambda function URLs with insecure authentication."""
lam = boto3.client("lambda", region_name=region)
findings = []
paginator = lam.get_paginator("list_functions")
for page in paginator.paginate():
for f in page["Functions"]:
try:
url_config = lam.get_function_url_config(FunctionName=f["FunctionName"])
auth_type = url_config.get("AuthType", "NONE")
if auth_type == "NONE":
findings.append({
"function": f["FunctionName"],
"url": url_config.get("FunctionUrl", ""),
"auth_type": auth_type,
"severity": "CRITICAL",
})
print(f" [!] CRITICAL: {f['FunctionName']} has unauthenticated URL: "
f"{url_config.get('FunctionUrl', '')}")
else:
print(f" [+] {f['FunctionName']}: URL auth={auth_type}")
except lam.exceptions.ResourceNotFoundException:
continue
print(f"[*] {len(findings)} functions with unauthenticated URLs")
return findings
def check_env_variables(region="us-east-1"):
"""Scan Lambda environment variables for potential hardcoded secrets."""
lam = boto3.client("lambda", region_name=region)
findings = []
secret_patterns = ["password", "secret", "api_key", "apikey", "token", "private_key",
"access_key", "db_pass", "database_url", "smtp"]
paginator = lam.get_paginator("list_functions")
for page in paginator.paginate():
for f in page["Functions"]:
env_vars = f.get("Environment", {}).get("Variables", {})
kms_key = f.get("KMSKeyArn")
for key, value in env_vars.items():
key_lower = key.lower()
if any(p in key_lower for p in secret_patterns):
has_kms = bool(kms_key)
findings.append({
"function": f["FunctionName"],
"variable": key,
"encrypted": has_kms,
"severity": "HIGH" if not has_kms else "MEDIUM",
})
enc_status = "KMS-encrypted" if has_kms else "PLAINTEXT"
print(f" [!] {f['FunctionName']}: {key} ({enc_status})")
print(f"[*] {len(findings)} potential secrets in environment variables")
return findings
def check_shared_roles(region="us-east-1"):
"""Identify Lambda functions sharing the same execution role."""
lam = boto3.client("lambda", region_name=region)
role_map = {}
paginator = lam.get_paginator("list_functions")
for page in paginator.paginate():
for f in page["Functions"]:
role = f["Role"]
role_name = role.split("/")[-1]
if role_name not in role_map:
role_map[role_name] = []
role_map[role_name].append(f["FunctionName"])
findings = []
print("\n[*] Checking for shared execution roles...")
for role, funcs in role_map.items():
if len(funcs) > 1:
findings.append({"role": role, "functions": funcs, "count": len(funcs)})
print(f" [!] Role '{role}' shared by {len(funcs)} functions: {', '.join(funcs[:5])}")
print(f"[*] {len(findings)} shared roles found")
return findings
def check_reserved_concurrency(region="us-east-1"):
"""Check if functions have reserved concurrency set to prevent resource exhaustion."""
lam = boto3.client("lambda", region_name=region)
no_concurrency = []
paginator = lam.get_paginator("list_functions")
for page in paginator.paginate():
for f in page["Functions"]:
try:
conc = lam.get_function_concurrency(FunctionName=f["FunctionName"])
reserved = conc.get("ReservedConcurrentExecutions")
if reserved is None:
no_concurrency.append(f["FunctionName"])
except Exception:
no_concurrency.append(f["FunctionName"])
if no_concurrency:
print(f"\n[*] {len(no_concurrency)} functions without reserved concurrency")
return no_concurrency
def full_audit(region="us-east-1", output_path="serverless_audit.json"):
"""Run comprehensive serverless security audit."""
print("[*] Starting serverless security audit...\n")
report = {
"audit_date": datetime.now().isoformat(),
"region": region,
"functions": list_functions(region),
"unauthenticated_urls": check_function_urls(region),
"env_secrets": check_env_variables(region),
"shared_roles": check_shared_roles(region),
"no_concurrency_limit": check_reserved_concurrency(region),
}
total_findings = (len(report["unauthenticated_urls"]) + len(report["env_secrets"]) +
len(report["shared_roles"]))
report["total_findings"] = total_findings
with open(output_path, "w") as f:
json.dump(report, f, indent=2, default=str)
print(f"\n[*] Audit complete: {total_findings} findings")
print(f"[*] Report saved to {output_path}")
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Serverless Function Security Agent")
parser.add_argument("action", choices=["list", "urls", "env-secrets", "shared-roles",
"concurrency", "full-audit"])
parser.add_argument("--region", default="us-east-1")
parser.add_argument("-o", "--output", default="serverless_audit.json")
args = parser.parse_args()
if args.action == "list":
list_functions(args.region)
elif args.action == "urls":
check_function_urls(args.region)
elif args.action == "env-secrets":
check_env_variables(args.region)
elif args.action == "shared-roles":
check_shared_roles(args.region)
elif args.action == "concurrency":
check_reserved_concurrency(args.region)
elif args.action == "full-audit":
full_audit(args.region, args.output)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()