npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-SkillsMITRE ATT&CK
When to Use
- When applications store database passwords, API keys, or certificates in environment variables or config files
- When migrating from static long-lived credentials to dynamic short-lived secrets
- When Kubernetes workloads need secure access to database credentials or cloud provider APIs
- When compliance requirements mandate centralized credential management with audit logging
- When CI/CD pipelines contain hardcoded secrets that represent supply chain risk
Do not use for AWS-only environments where AWS Secrets Manager suffices without multi-cloud requirements, for application-level encryption logic (though Vault Transit can help), or for identity federation (see managing-cloud-identity-with-okta).
Prerequisites
- HashiCorp Vault server deployed in HA mode (Consul or Raft storage backend)
- TLS certificates for Vault listener endpoints
- Vault Enterprise license for namespaces, Sentinel policies, and replication (optional)
- Kubernetes cluster with Vault Agent Injector or CSI provider for workload integration
Workflow
Step 1: Deploy Vault in High Availability Mode
Deploy Vault using Integrated Storage (Raft) for HA without external dependencies. Configure TLS, audit logging, and auto-unseal using a cloud KMS.
# vault-config.hcl
storage "raft" {
path = "/opt/vault/data"
node_id = "vault-node-1"
retry_join {
leader_api_addr = "https://vault-node-2.internal:8200"
}
retry_join {
leader_api_addr = "https://vault-node-3.internal:8200"
}
}
listener "tcp" {
address = "0.0.0.0:8200"
tls_cert_file = "/opt/vault/tls/vault.crt"
tls_key_file = "/opt/vault/tls/vault.key"
}
seal "awskms" {
region = "us-east-1"
kms_key_id = "alias/vault-unseal-key"
}
api_addr = "https://vault-node-1.internal:8200"
cluster_addr = "https://vault-node-1.internal:8201"
telemetry {
prometheus_retention_time = "30s"
disable_hostname = true
}# Initialize Vault
vault operator init -key-shares=5 -key-threshold=3
# Enable audit logging
vault audit enable file file_path=/var/log/vault/audit.log
# Enable syslog audit for SIEM integration
vault audit enable syslog tag="vault" facility="AUTH"Step 2: Configure Authentication Methods
Enable authentication backends for human operators, applications, and CI/CD pipelines. Use AppRole for machine authentication and OIDC for human access.
# Enable OIDC auth for human users via Okta
vault auth enable oidc
vault write auth/oidc/config \
oidc_discovery_url="https://company.okta.com/oauth2/default" \
oidc_client_id="vault-client-id" \
oidc_client_secret="vault-client-secret" \
default_role="default"
# Enable AppRole for application authentication
vault auth enable approle
vault write auth/approle/role/web-app \
secret_id_ttl=10m \
token_num_uses=10 \
token_ttl=20m \
token_max_ttl=30m \
secret_id_num_uses=1 \
token_policies="web-app-policy"
# Enable Kubernetes auth for pod-based access
vault auth enable kubernetes
vault write auth/kubernetes/config \
kubernetes_host="https://kubernetes.default.svc:443" \
token_reviewer_jwt=@/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token \
kubernetes_ca_cert=@/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crtStep 3: Enable Dynamic Secret Engines
Configure database secret engines to generate short-lived credentials on demand. Each credential set has a TTL and is automatically revoked when it expires.
# Enable database secrets engine for PostgreSQL
vault secrets enable database
vault write database/config/production-db \
plugin_name=postgresql-database-plugin \
allowed_roles="readonly,readwrite" \
connection_url="postgresql://{{username}}:{{password}}@db.internal:5432/production?sslmode=require" \
username="vault_admin" \
password="initial-password"
# Rotate the root credentials so Vault manages them exclusively
vault write -force database/rotate-root/production-db
# Create a readonly role with 1-hour TTL
vault write database/roles/readonly \
db_name=production-db \
creation_statements="CREATE ROLE \"{{name}}\" WITH LOGIN PASSWORD '{{password}}' VALID UNTIL '{{expiration}}'; GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO \"{{name}}\";" \
revocation_statements="REVOKE ALL ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public FROM \"{{name}}\"; DROP ROLE IF EXISTS \"{{name}}\";" \
default_ttl="1h" \
max_ttl="24h"
# Enable AWS secrets engine for dynamic IAM credentials
vault secrets enable aws
vault write aws/config/root \
access_key=AKIAEXAMPLE \
secret_key=secretkey \
region=us-east-1
vault write aws/roles/deploy-role \
credential_type=iam_user \
policy_document=@deploy-policy.json \
default_sts_ttl=3600Step 4: Integrate with Kubernetes Workloads
Use the Vault Agent Injector or CSI Provider to deliver secrets to pods without application code changes. Secrets are rendered as files in a shared volume.
# Kubernetes deployment with Vault Agent Injector annotations
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: web-app
spec:
template:
metadata:
annotations:
vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject: "true"
vault.hashicorp.com/role: "web-app"
vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-db-creds: "database/creds/readonly"
vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-db-creds: |
{{- with secret "database/creds/readonly" -}}
export DB_USERNAME="{{ .Data.username }}"
export DB_PASSWORD="{{ .Data.password }}"
{{- end }}
spec:
serviceAccountName: web-app
containers:
- name: web-app
image: company/web-app:v2.1
command: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "source /vault/secrets/db-creds && ./start.sh"]Step 5: Implement Transit Encryption and PKI
Use the Transit secrets engine for application-level encryption without managing keys in application code. Deploy the PKI engine for automatic TLS certificate management.
# Enable Transit engine for encryption as a service
vault secrets enable transit
vault write -f transit/keys/payment-data type=aes256-gcm96
# Encrypt sensitive data
vault write transit/encrypt/payment-data \
plaintext=$(echo "card-number-4111-1111-1111-1111" | base64)
# Enable PKI for internal certificate management
vault secrets enable pki
vault secrets tune -max-lease-ttl=87600h pki
# Generate root CA
vault write pki/root/generate/internal \
common_name="Internal Root CA" \
ttl=87600h
# Configure intermediate CA for issuing certificates
vault secrets enable -path=pki_int pki
vault write pki_int/intermediate/generate/internal \
common_name="Internal Intermediate CA" \
ttl=43800h
# Create a role for issuing certificates
vault write pki_int/roles/internal-services \
allowed_domains="internal.company.com" \
allow_subdomains=true \
max_ttl=720hStep 6: Establish Policies and Audit Trail
Define fine-grained ACL policies following least privilege. Enable comprehensive audit logging for all secret access and administrative operations.
# web-app-policy.hcl
path "database/creds/readonly" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "transit/encrypt/payment-data" {
capabilities = ["update"]
}
path "transit/decrypt/payment-data" {
capabilities = ["update"]
}
path "secret/data/web-app/*" {
capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}
# Deny access to admin paths
path "sys/*" {
capabilities = ["deny"]
}# Apply the policy
vault policy write web-app-policy web-app-policy.hcl
# Verify audit log captures all operations
vault audit list -detailedKey Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Dynamic Secrets | Credentials generated on-demand with automatic expiration and revocation, eliminating long-lived static credentials |
| Secret Engine | Vault component that stores, generates, or encrypts data; includes KV, database, AWS, PKI, and Transit engines |
| Auto-Unseal | Cloud KMS-based mechanism that automatically unseals Vault nodes on restart without manual key entry |
| AppRole | Machine-oriented authentication method using Role ID and Secret ID for application and CI/CD pipeline access |
| Transit Engine | Encryption-as-a-service engine that handles cryptographic operations without exposing encryption keys to applications |
| Lease | Time-bound credential with a TTL that Vault automatically revokes on expiration unless renewed |
| Namespace | Vault Enterprise feature providing tenant isolation with separate auth, secrets, and policy management |
| Response Wrapping | Technique that wraps secret responses in a single-use token to prevent man-in-the-middle exposure during delivery |
Tools & Systems
- HashiCorp Vault: Core secrets management platform providing dynamic secrets, encryption, and identity-based access
- Vault Agent Injector: Kubernetes mutating webhook that automatically injects Vault secrets into pod volumes via sidecar containers
- Vault CSI Provider: Kubernetes CSI driver that mounts Vault secrets directly into pod volumes without sidecar containers
- consul-template: Template rendering daemon that watches Vault secrets and re-renders configuration files when secrets change
- Vault Radar: Secret scanning tool that detects hardcoded credentials in source code, CI/CD pipelines, and cloud configurations
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Eliminating Hardcoded Database Credentials from CI/CD Pipeline
Context: A DevOps team stores PostgreSQL credentials in GitHub Actions secrets and Jenkins credential stores. The same credentials are shared across staging and production environments with no rotation for 18 months.
Approach:
- Deploy Vault with AppRole auth enabled for CI/CD systems
- Configure the database secrets engine with separate roles for staging (readwrite, 2h TTL) and production (readonly, 1h TTL)
- Create separate Vault policies for each pipeline stage restricting access to the appropriate database role
- Update GitHub Actions workflows to authenticate via AppRole and request dynamic credentials at the start of each job
- Rotate the static PostgreSQL credentials and hand root access to Vault exclusively
- Enable audit logging to track every credential request with pipeline job metadata
Pitfalls: Failing to rotate the original static credentials after Vault migration leaves the old credentials valid. Setting TTLs too short causes credential expiry mid-deployment for long-running jobs.
Output Format
Vault Secrets Management Audit Report
=======================================
Vault Cluster: vault.internal.company.com
Version: 1.18.1 Enterprise
HA Mode: Raft (3 nodes)
Seal Type: AWS KMS Auto-Unseal
Report Date: 2025-02-23
SECRET ENGINES:
database/ PostgreSQL dynamic creds Leases Active: 47
aws/ Dynamic IAM credentials Leases Active: 12
transit/ Encryption as a service Keys: 8
pki/ Root CA Certs Issued: 0
pki_int/ Intermediate CA Certs Issued: 234
secret/ KV v2 static secrets Versions: 1,892
AUTH METHODS:
oidc/ Okta SSO for humans Active Tokens: 23
approle/ CI/CD pipelines Active Tokens: 156
kubernetes/ Pod-based auth Active Tokens: 89
AUDIT FINDINGS:
[WARN] 3 AppRole secret_id_num_uses set to 0 (unlimited)
[WARN] 12 KV secrets not accessed in 90+ days (potential orphans)
[PASS] All dynamic secret TTLs under 24 hours
[PASS] Audit logging enabled on all nodes
[PASS] Root token revoked after initial setup
CREDENTIAL HYGIENE:
Static Secrets (KV): 234
Dynamic Secrets Active: 59
Average Lease TTL: 2.3 hours
Secrets Rotated This Month: 12,456References and resources
Everything below is rendered for inspection. Script files are read-only and never run.
References 1
api-reference.md4.1 KB
API Reference: HashiCorp Vault Secrets Management
Libraries Used
| Library | Purpose |
|---|---|
hvac |
Official Python client for HashiCorp Vault API |
requests |
HTTP fallback for direct Vault REST calls |
json |
Parse Vault JSON responses |
os |
Read VAULT_ADDR and VAULT_TOKEN environment variables |
Installation
pip install hvac requestsAuthentication
Token Authentication
import hvac
client = hvac.Client(
url=os.environ.get("VAULT_ADDR", "https://127.0.0.1:8200"),
token=os.environ.get("VAULT_TOKEN"),
)
assert client.is_authenticated()AppRole Authentication
client = hvac.Client(url=os.environ["VAULT_ADDR"])
resp = client.auth.approle.login(
role_id=os.environ["VAULT_ROLE_ID"],
secret_id=os.environ["VAULT_SECRET_ID"],
)
client.token = resp["auth"]["client_token"]Kubernetes Authentication
with open("/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token") as f:
jwt = f.read()
client.auth.kubernetes.login(role="my-role", jwt=jwt)Core API — KV Secrets Engine v2
Write a Secret
client.secrets.kv.v2.create_or_update_secret(
path="myapp/database",
secret={"username": "admin", "password": "s3cure!"},
mount_point="secret",
)Read a Secret
resp = client.secrets.kv.v2.read_secret_version(
path="myapp/database",
mount_point="secret",
)
data = resp["data"]["data"] # {"username": "admin", "password": "s3cure!"}List Secrets
resp = client.secrets.kv.v2.list_secrets(path="myapp/", mount_point="secret")
keys = resp["data"]["keys"] # ["database", "api-keys", ...]Delete a Secret
client.secrets.kv.v2.delete_metadata_and_all_versions(
path="myapp/database",
mount_point="secret",
)System Backend — Audit and Health
Check Seal Status
status = client.sys.read_seal_status()
# {"sealed": False, "t": 3, "n": 5, "progress": 0}List Auth Methods
methods = client.sys.list_auth_methods()
# {"token/": {...}, "approle/": {...}, ...}List Enabled Secrets Engines
engines = client.sys.list_mounted_secrets_engines()Enable Audit Device
client.sys.enable_audit_device(
device_type="file",
options={"file_path": "/var/log/vault_audit.log"},
)Transit Secrets Engine — Encryption as a Service
Encrypt Data
import base64
plaintext_b64 = base64.b64encode(b"sensitive-data").decode()
resp = client.secrets.transit.encrypt_data(
name="my-key",
plaintext=plaintext_b64,
)
ciphertext = resp["data"]["ciphertext"] # "vault:v1:..."Decrypt Data
resp = client.secrets.transit.decrypt_data(
name="my-key",
ciphertext=ciphertext,
)
plaintext = base64.b64decode(resp["data"]["plaintext"])REST API Endpoints (Direct)
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /v1/sys/health |
Health check and seal status |
| GET | /v1/sys/seal-status |
Detailed seal status |
| POST | /v1/auth/token/create |
Create new token |
| GET | /v1/secret/data/{path} |
Read KV v2 secret |
| POST | /v1/secret/data/{path} |
Write KV v2 secret |
| LIST | /v1/secret/metadata/{path} |
List secrets at path |
| DELETE | /v1/secret/metadata/{path} |
Permanently delete secret |
| POST | /v1/transit/encrypt/{key} |
Encrypt with transit engine |
| POST | /v1/transit/decrypt/{key} |
Decrypt with transit engine |
Error Handling
from hvac.exceptions import Forbidden, InvalidPath, VaultError
try:
secret = client.secrets.kv.v2.read_secret_version(path="missing")
except InvalidPath:
print("Secret path does not exist")
except Forbidden:
print("Insufficient permissions — check Vault policy")
except VaultError as e:
print(f"Vault error: {e}")Output Format
{
"request_id": "abc-123",
"lease_id": "",
"renewable": false,
"data": {
"data": {"username": "admin", "password": "s3cure!"},
"metadata": {
"created_time": "2025-01-15T10:30:00.000Z",
"version": 3,
"destroyed": false
}
}
}Scripts 1
agent.py10.7 KB
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""HashiCorp Vault secrets management agent.
Manages secrets lifecycle using the HashiCorp Vault KV v2 secrets engine
via the hvac Python library. Supports reading, writing, listing, deleting
secrets, and auditing secret access patterns.
"""
import argparse
import json
import os
import sys
from datetime import datetime, timezone
try:
import hvac
except ImportError:
print("[!] 'hvac' library required: pip install hvac", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
def get_vault_client(addr=None, token=None, namespace=None):
"""Create and authenticate a Vault client."""
vault_addr = addr or os.environ.get("VAULT_ADDR", "http://127.0.0.1:8200")
vault_token = token or os.environ.get("VAULT_TOKEN", "")
vault_ns = namespace or os.environ.get("VAULT_NAMESPACE")
if not vault_token:
print("[!] Set VAULT_TOKEN env var or use --token", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
client = hvac.Client(url=vault_addr, token=vault_token, namespace=vault_ns)
if not client.is_authenticated():
print("[!] Vault authentication failed", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
print(f"[+] Connected to Vault at {vault_addr}")
return client
def write_secret(client, path, data, mount_point="secret"):
"""Write or update a secret in KV v2."""
print(f"[*] Writing secret to {mount_point}/{path}")
response = client.secrets.kv.v2.create_or_update_secret(
path=path, secret=data, mount_point=mount_point,
)
version = response.get("data", {}).get("version", "unknown")
print(f"[+] Secret written (version: {version})")
return {"path": path, "version": version, "action": "write"}
def read_secret(client, path, mount_point="secret", version=None):
"""Read a secret from KV v2."""
print(f"[*] Reading secret from {mount_point}/{path}")
kwargs = {"path": path, "mount_point": mount_point}
if version:
kwargs["version"] = version
response = client.secrets.kv.v2.read_secret_version(**kwargs)
secret_data = response.get("data", {}).get("data", {})
metadata = response.get("data", {}).get("metadata", {})
print(f"[+] Secret read (version: {metadata.get('version', '?')}, "
f"created: {metadata.get('created_time', 'unknown')})")
masked = {k: v[:3] + "***" if isinstance(v, str) and len(v) > 3 else "***"
for k, v in secret_data.items()}
return {
"path": path,
"keys": list(secret_data.keys()),
"masked_values": masked,
"version": metadata.get("version"),
"created_time": metadata.get("created_time"),
"deletion_time": metadata.get("deletion_time"),
"destroyed": metadata.get("destroyed"),
}
def list_secrets(client, path="", mount_point="secret"):
"""List secret paths under a given prefix."""
print(f"[*] Listing secrets under {mount_point}/{path}")
try:
response = client.secrets.kv.v2.list_secrets(
path=path, mount_point=mount_point
)
keys = response.get("data", {}).get("keys", [])
print(f"[+] Found {len(keys)} entries")
for key in keys:
marker = "/" if key.endswith("/") else " "
print(f" {marker} {key}")
return {"path": path, "entries": keys, "count": len(keys)}
except hvac.exceptions.InvalidPath:
print(f"[*] No secrets found at {mount_point}/{path}")
return {"path": path, "entries": [], "count": 0}
def delete_secret(client, path, mount_point="secret", versions=None, destroy=False):
"""Delete or destroy a secret."""
if destroy and versions:
print(f"[*] Permanently destroying versions {versions} at {mount_point}/{path}")
client.secrets.kv.v2.destroy_secret_versions(
path=path, versions=versions, mount_point=mount_point
)
print(f"[+] Versions {versions} permanently destroyed")
return {"path": path, "action": "destroy", "versions": versions}
elif versions:
print(f"[*] Soft-deleting versions {versions} at {mount_point}/{path}")
client.secrets.kv.v2.delete_secret_versions(
path=path, versions=versions, mount_point=mount_point
)
print(f"[+] Versions {versions} soft-deleted (recoverable)")
return {"path": path, "action": "soft_delete", "versions": versions}
else:
print(f"[*] Deleting latest version at {mount_point}/{path}")
client.secrets.kv.v2.delete_latest_version_of_secret(
path=path, mount_point=mount_point
)
print(f"[+] Latest version deleted")
return {"path": path, "action": "delete_latest"}
def read_metadata(client, path, mount_point="secret"):
"""Read secret metadata including version history."""
print(f"[*] Reading metadata for {mount_point}/{path}")
response = client.secrets.kv.v2.read_secret_metadata(
path=path, mount_point=mount_point
)
meta = response.get("data", {})
versions = meta.get("versions", {})
print(f"[+] {len(versions)} version(s), max_versions: {meta.get('max_versions', 0)}")
version_info = []
for ver_num, ver_data in sorted(versions.items(), key=lambda x: int(x[0])):
version_info.append({
"version": int(ver_num),
"created_time": ver_data.get("created_time"),
"deletion_time": ver_data.get("deletion_time"),
"destroyed": ver_data.get("destroyed", False),
})
return {
"path": path,
"current_version": meta.get("current_version"),
"max_versions": meta.get("max_versions"),
"cas_required": meta.get("cas_required"),
"created_time": meta.get("created_time"),
"updated_time": meta.get("updated_time"),
"versions": version_info,
}
def audit_secrets(client, mount_point="secret", path_prefix=""):
"""Audit all secrets under a path, reporting metadata and age."""
print(f"[*] Auditing secrets under {mount_point}/{path_prefix}")
audit_results = []
def _recurse(current_path):
try:
resp = client.secrets.kv.v2.list_secrets(
path=current_path, mount_point=mount_point
)
except hvac.exceptions.InvalidPath:
return
keys = resp.get("data", {}).get("keys", [])
for key in keys:
full_path = f"{current_path}{key}" if current_path else key
if key.endswith("/"):
_recurse(full_path)
else:
try:
meta_resp = client.secrets.kv.v2.read_secret_metadata(
path=full_path, mount_point=mount_point
)
meta = meta_resp.get("data", {})
audit_results.append({
"path": full_path,
"current_version": meta.get("current_version"),
"created_time": meta.get("created_time"),
"updated_time": meta.get("updated_time"),
"version_count": len(meta.get("versions", {})),
})
except Exception as e:
audit_results.append({"path": full_path, "error": str(e)})
_recurse(path_prefix)
print(f"[+] Audited {len(audit_results)} secret(s)")
for item in audit_results:
if "error" in item:
print(f" [ERR] {item['path']}: {item['error']}")
else:
print(f" {item['path']:40s} v{item['current_version']} "
f"(updated: {str(item.get('updated_time', 'N/A'))[:19]})")
return audit_results
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="HashiCorp Vault secrets management agent"
)
sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", help="Action to perform")
p_write = sub.add_parser("write", help="Write a secret")
p_write.add_argument("--path", required=True, help="Secret path")
p_write.add_argument("--data", required=True, help='JSON data')
p_write.add_argument("--mount", default="secret", help="KV mount point")
p_read = sub.add_parser("read", help="Read a secret")
p_read.add_argument("--path", required=True)
p_read.add_argument("--version", type=int, help="Specific version")
p_read.add_argument("--mount", default="secret")
p_list = sub.add_parser("list", help="List secrets")
p_list.add_argument("--path", default="")
p_list.add_argument("--mount", default="secret")
p_del = sub.add_parser("delete", help="Delete a secret")
p_del.add_argument("--path", required=True)
p_del.add_argument("--versions", type=int, nargs="+")
p_del.add_argument("--destroy", action="store_true")
p_del.add_argument("--mount", default="secret")
p_meta = sub.add_parser("metadata", help="Read secret metadata")
p_meta.add_argument("--path", required=True)
p_meta.add_argument("--mount", default="secret")
p_audit = sub.add_parser("audit", help="Audit all secrets")
p_audit.add_argument("--path", default="")
p_audit.add_argument("--mount", default="secret")
parser.add_argument("--addr", help="Vault address (or VAULT_ADDR env)")
parser.add_argument("--token", help="Vault token (or VAULT_TOKEN env)")
parser.add_argument("--namespace", help="Vault namespace")
parser.add_argument("--output", "-o", help="Output JSON report")
parser.add_argument("--verbose", "-v", action="store_true")
args = parser.parse_args()
if not args.command:
parser.print_help()
sys.exit(1)
client = get_vault_client(args.addr, args.token, args.namespace)
if args.command == "write":
secret_data = json.loads(args.data)
result = write_secret(client, args.path, secret_data, args.mount)
elif args.command == "read":
result = read_secret(client, args.path, args.mount,
getattr(args, "version", None))
elif args.command == "list":
result = list_secrets(client, args.path, args.mount)
elif args.command == "delete":
result = delete_secret(client, args.path, args.mount,
getattr(args, "versions", None),
getattr(args, "destroy", False))
elif args.command == "metadata":
result = read_metadata(client, args.path, args.mount)
elif args.command == "audit":
result = audit_secrets(client, args.mount, args.path)
else:
parser.print_help()
sys.exit(1)
report = {
"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
"tool": "HashiCorp Vault",
"command": args.command,
"result": result,
}
if args.output:
with open(args.output, "w") as f:
json.dump(report, f, indent=2)
print(f"\n[+] Report saved to {args.output}")
elif args.verbose:
print(json.dumps(report, indent=2))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()