ransomware defense

Detecting Ransomware Precursors in Network Traffic

Detects early-stage ransomware indicators in network traffic before encryption begins, including initial access broker activity, command-and-control beaconing, credential harvesting, reconnaissance scanning, and staging behavior. Uses network detection tools (Zeek, Suricata, Arkime), SIEM correlation rules, and threat intelligence feeds to identify ransomware precursor patterns such as Cobalt Strike beacons, Mimikatz network signatures, and RDP brute-force attempts. Activates for requests involving pre-ransomware detection, network-based ransomware indicators, or early warning ransomware monitoring.

defensedetectionincident-responsenetwork-securityransomware
Install this skill
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
Framework mappings

When to Use

  • Building detection rules for pre-ransomware network activity (the average time from Cobalt Strike deployment to encryption is 17 minutes)
  • Monitoring for initial access broker (IAB) indicators that precede ransomware deployment
  • Creating SIEM correlation rules that chain multiple precursor events into high-confidence alerts
  • Tuning network detection systems to distinguish ransomware staging from normal administrative activity
  • Investigating suspicious network patterns that may indicate ransomware operators have established a foothold

Do not use for post-encryption response (see recovering-from-ransomware-attack). This skill focuses on the pre-encryption detection window where containment can prevent data loss.

Prerequisites

  • Network detection platform (Zeek/Bro, Suricata, or Arkime/Moloch) deployed on network TAP or SPAN ports
  • SIEM platform (Splunk, Elastic Security, Microsoft Sentinel, or QRadar) ingesting network logs
  • Threat intelligence feeds covering ransomware IOCs (CISA, abuse.ch, OTX, MISP)
  • Network flow data (NetFlow/IPFIX) from core routers and firewalls
  • DNS query logging from internal resolvers
  • Full packet capture capability for incident investigation

Workflow

Step 1: Identify Ransomware Kill Chain Phases in Network Traffic

Map network-observable indicators to each pre-encryption phase:

Kill Chain Phase Network Indicators Detection Source
Initial Access RDP brute force, VPN credential stuffing, phishing callback Firewall logs, IDS, proxy logs
C2 Establishment Cobalt Strike beacons (HTTPS/DNS), Sliver/Brute Ratel callbacks Zeek SSL/HTTP logs, DNS logs
Credential Harvesting NTLM relay, Kerberoasting, DCSync traffic Zeek Kerberos/NTLM logs, DC logs
Reconnaissance Internal port scanning, AD enumeration (LDAP/SMB) Zeek conn.log, flow data
Lateral Movement PsExec/WMI/WinRM traffic, RDP pivoting, SMB file copies Zeek SMB/DCE-RPC logs
Staging Data aggregation, archive creation, cloud upload prep Proxy logs, DNS logs, DLP

Step 2: Deploy Network Detection Rules

Suricata rules for common ransomware precursors:

# Cobalt Strike default HTTPS beacon profile detection
alert tls $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Cobalt Strike Default TLS Certificate"; tls.cert_subject; content:"Major Cobalt Strike"; sid:3000001; rev:1;)
 
# Cobalt Strike DNS beacon
alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any 53 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Cobalt Strike DNS Beacon Pattern"; dns.query; pcre:"/^[a-z0-9]{3}\.[a-z]{4,8}\./"; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 50, seconds 60; sid:3000002; rev:1;)
 
# Mimikatz network signature (DCSync - DRS GetNCChanges)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 135 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Possible DCSync/Mimikatz"; content:"|05 00 0b|"; offset:0; depth:3; content:"|e3 51 4d 2b 4b 47 15 d2|"; sid:3000003; rev:1;)
 
# Internal network scanning (many connections, few bytes)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Internal Port Scan"; flags:S; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 100, seconds 10; sid:3000004; rev:1;)
 
# PsExec service installation over SMB
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - PsExec Service Install"; content:"|ff|SMB"; content:"PSEXESVC"; nocase; sid:3000005; rev:1;)
 
# RDP brute force from internal host (lateral movement)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 3389 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Internal RDP Brute Force"; flow:to_server,established; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 20, seconds 60; sid:3000006; rev:1;)
 
# Large SMB file transfer (data staging)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Large SMB Transfer Possible Staging"; flow:to_server,established; dsize:>60000; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 100, seconds 300; sid:3000007; rev:1;)

Zeek scripts for behavioral detection:

# detect_ransomware_precursors.zeek
# Detect high volume of failed SMB connections (credential testing)
 
@load base/protocols/smb
 
module RansomwarePrecursor;
 
export {
    redef enum Notice::Type += {
        SMB_Brute_Force,
        Suspicious_Internal_Scan,
        Excessive_DNS_Queries,
        SMB_Admin_Share_Access,
    };
 
    const smb_fail_threshold = 10 &redef;
    const scan_threshold = 50 &redef;
    const dns_query_threshold = 200 &redef;
}
 
global smb_fail_count: table[addr] of count &default=0 &create_expire=5min;
global conn_count: table[addr] of set[addr] &create_expire=1min;
 
event smb2_message(c: connection, hdr: SMB2::Header, is_orig: bool) {
    if (hdr$status != 0) {
        ++smb_fail_count[c$id$orig_h];
        if (smb_fail_count[c$id$orig_h] >= smb_fail_threshold) {
            NOTICE([$note=SMB_Brute_Force,
                    $msg=fmt("Host %s has %d failed SMB attempts", c$id$orig_h, smb_fail_count[c$id$orig_h]),
                    $src=c$id$orig_h,
                    $identifier=cat(c$id$orig_h)]);
        }
    }
}
 
event new_connection(c: connection) {
    if (c$id$orig_h in Site::local_nets && c$id$resp_h in Site::local_nets) {
        if (c$id$orig_h !in conn_count)
            conn_count[c$id$orig_h] = set();
        add conn_count[c$id$orig_h][c$id$resp_h];
        if (|conn_count[c$id$orig_h]| >= scan_threshold) {
            NOTICE([$note=Suspicious_Internal_Scan,
                    $msg=fmt("Host %s connected to %d internal hosts in 1 min", c$id$orig_h, |conn_count[c$id$orig_h]|),
                    $src=c$id$orig_h,
                    $identifier=cat(c$id$orig_h)]);
        }
    }
}

Step 3: Create SIEM Correlation Rules

Splunk correlation for ransomware precursor chain:

| tstats count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic
  WHERE earliest=-24h All_Traffic.dest_port IN (445, 135, 139, 3389, 5985, 5986)
    AND All_Traffic.src_ip IN 10.0.0.0/8
    AND All_Traffic.dest_ip IN 10.0.0.0/8
  BY All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_port, _time span=1h
| stats dc(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port_count,
        values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as ports,
        count as total_conns
  BY All_Traffic.src_ip
| where port_count >= 3 AND total_conns > 50
| rename All_Traffic.src_ip as src_ip
| lookup threat_intel_ioc ip as src_ip OUTPUT threat_type
| eval risk_score = case(
    port_count >= 5 AND total_conns > 200, "CRITICAL",
    port_count >= 3 AND total_conns > 50, "HIGH",
    1=1, "MEDIUM")
| table src_ip, ports, port_count, total_conns, risk_score, threat_type

Microsoft Sentinel KQL - Ransomware precursor correlation:

let timeframe = 24h;
let RDPBruteForce = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4625
| where LogonType == 10
| summarize FailedRDP = count() by TargetAccount, IpAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where FailedRDP > 10;
let SuspiciousSMB = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 5145
| where ShareName has "ADMIN$" or ShareName has "C$" or ShareName has "IPC$"
| summarize AdminShareAccess = count() by SubjectUserName, IpAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where AdminShareAccess > 5;
let ServiceInstalls = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 7045
| where ServiceName has_any ("PSEXESVC", "meterpreter", "beacon");
RDPBruteForce
| join kind=inner SuspiciousSMB on IpAddress
| project TimeGenerated, IpAddress, TargetAccount, FailedRDP, SubjectUserName, AdminShareAccess
| extend AlertTitle = "Ransomware Precursor: RDP Brute Force + Admin Share Access"

Step 4: Integrate Threat Intelligence

Configure automated IOC feeds for known ransomware infrastructure:

# Download and update ransomware C2 blocklists
# abuse.ch Feodo Tracker (Cobalt Strike, TrickBot, BazarLoader C2s)
curl -s https://feodotracker.abuse.ch/downloads/ipblocklist.csv | \
  grep -v "^#" | cut -d, -f2 > /opt/threat-intel/feodo_ips.txt
 
# abuse.ch URLhaus (malware distribution URLs)
curl -s https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/downloads/csv_recent/ | \
  grep -v "^#" | cut -d, -f3 > /opt/threat-intel/urlhaus_urls.txt
 
# abuse.ch ThreatFox (ransomware IOCs)
curl -s https://threatfox.abuse.ch/export/csv/recent/ | \
  grep -i "ransomware" | cut -d, -f3 > /opt/threat-intel/ransomware_iocs.txt
 
# CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (initial access vectors)
curl -s https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json | \
  python3 -c "import json,sys; data=json.load(sys.stdin); [print(v['cveID'],v['vendorProject'],v['product']) for v in data['vulnerabilities'] if 'ransomware' in v.get('knownRansomwareCampaignUse','').lower()]"

Step 5: Establish Alert Triage and Escalation

Define triage procedures based on precursor confidence level:

Alert Type Confidence Response Time Action
Confirmed Cobalt Strike beacon High 15 minutes Isolate host immediately, trigger IR
DCSync/Kerberoasting from non-DC High 15 minutes Disable account, isolate host, trigger IR
Internal port scan + admin share access Medium-High 30 minutes Investigate source host, check EDR telemetry
RDP brute force from internal host Medium 1 hour Verify if legitimate admin activity, check host
Unusual DNS query volume Low-Medium 4 hours Check for DNS tunneling, correlate with other alerts

Key Concepts

Term Definition
Ransomware Precursor Network activity that precedes ransomware encryption, including C2 communication, lateral movement, and data staging
Dwell Time Time between initial compromise and ransomware deployment, averaging 21 days but sometimes as short as 17 minutes
Initial Access Broker (IAB) Threat actors who sell compromised network access to ransomware operators on dark web markets
Beaconing Periodic C2 callbacks from implants (Cobalt Strike, Sliver) that can be detected by analyzing connection timing patterns
Kerberoasting Credential harvesting technique requesting Kerberos service tickets for offline cracking, detectable via unusual TGS-REQ patterns
DCSync Technique using Directory Replication Service to extract password hashes from domain controllers, critical ransomware precursor

Tools & Systems

  • Zeek (formerly Bro): Network analysis framework generating structured logs for SMB, Kerberos, DNS, HTTP, and TLS connections
  • Suricata: High-performance IDS/IPS with protocol analysis and multi-threading support for ransomware signature detection
  • Arkime (formerly Moloch): Full packet capture and search platform for deep forensic investigation of network events
  • RITA (Real Intelligence Threat Analytics): Open-source tool for detecting beaconing, DNS tunneling, and long connections in Zeek logs
  • AC-Hunter: Network threat hunting platform from Active Countermeasures for beacon detection and C2 identification

Common Scenarios

Scenario: Detecting LockBit Precursors in a Manufacturing Network

Context: A manufacturing company's SOC receives an alert for unusual SMB traffic from a workstation (10.1.5.42) in the engineering department. The workstation connected to 47 internal hosts on port 445 within 5 minutes at 2:00 AM.

Approach:

  1. Zeek conn.log analysis shows 10.1.5.42 initiated connections to 47 unique internal IPs on port 445, 135, and 3389 between 01:55-02:05
  2. Zeek ssl.log reveals an outbound HTTPS connection to 185.x.x.x every 60 seconds with consistent 48-byte payloads (Cobalt Strike beacon pattern)
  3. RITA beacon analysis confirms high beacon score (0.96) for the external IP with 60-second jitter
  4. Zeek kerberos.log shows TGS-REQ for multiple SPN accounts from 10.1.5.42 (Kerberoasting)
  5. SMB tree_connect events show access to ADMIN$ shares on 12 hosts (lateral movement staging)
  6. Containment: Host isolated, credentials for engineering user reset, blocking rule for C2 IP deployed
  7. Full IR initiated before ransomware deployment could begin

Pitfalls:

  • Dismissing internal port scans as vulnerability scanner activity without verifying the source is an authorized scanner
  • Not correlating individual low-severity alerts (DNS anomaly + SMB access + failed logins) into a high-severity chain
  • Setting detection thresholds too high to avoid false positives, missing low-and-slow reconnaissance
  • Ignoring encrypted traffic analysis (JA3/JA4 fingerprinting) that can identify Cobalt Strike even in TLS tunnels

Output Format

## Ransomware Precursor Detection Alert
 
**Alert ID**: [SIEM-generated ID]
**Detection Time**: [Timestamp]
**Source Host**: [IP / Hostname]
**Confidence**: [High / Medium / Low]
**Kill Chain Phase**: [Initial Access / C2 / Credential Harvest / Recon / Lateral Movement / Staging]
 
### Indicators Detected
| Indicator | Source | Detail | MITRE ATT&CK |
|-----------|--------|--------|--------------|
| [Type] | [Zeek/Suricata/SIEM] | [Description] | [T-ID] |
 
### Correlation Chain
1. [Timestamp] - [Event 1]
2. [Timestamp] - [Event 2]
3. [Timestamp] - [Event 3]
 
### Recommended Actions
- [ ] Isolate source host from network
- [ ] Check EDR telemetry for host-based indicators
- [ ] Reset credentials for affected user accounts
- [ ] Block identified C2 infrastructure
- [ ] Escalate to incident response team
Source materials

References and resources

Everything below is rendered for inspection. Script files are read-only and never run.

References 3

api-reference.md5.2 KB

API Reference — Detecting Ransomware Precursors in Network Traffic

Zeek (Bro) Log Fields

conn.log

Field Type Description
ts time Connection start timestamp (Unix epoch)
id.orig_h addr Source IP address
id.orig_p port Source port
id.resp_h addr Destination IP address
id.resp_p port Destination port
proto enum Transport protocol (tcp/udp/icmp)
orig_bytes count Bytes sent by originator
resp_bytes count Bytes sent by responder
conn_state string Connection state (SF=normal, S0=no reply, REJ=rejected)
duration interval Duration of connection

smb_files.log

Field Type Description
action enum SMB action (SMB_FILE_OPEN, SMB_FILE_WRITE, SMB_FILE_DELETE)
path string Full UNC path accessed
name string Filename
size count File size in bytes
id.orig_h addr Source host (accessor)
id.resp_h addr Target host

kerberos.log

Field Type Description
request_type string KRB_AS_REQ, KRB_TGS_REQ
client string Client principal
service string Service principal (SPN)
success bool Whether request succeeded
error_msg string Error type (e.g., KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED)

Suricata CLI

Start in IDS mode

suricata -c /etc/suricata/suricata.yaml -i eth0

Start in IPS mode (NFQUEUE)

suricata -c /etc/suricata/suricata.yaml -q 0
# Configure iptables to send traffic to NFQUEUE:
iptables -I FORWARD -j NFQUEUE --queue-num 0

Run on pcap file

suricata -c /etc/suricata/suricata.yaml -r capture.pcap -l /var/log/suricata/

Update rules with suricata-update

suricata-update                          # Update all enabled sources
suricata-update list-sources             # List available rule sources
suricata-update enable-source et/open    # Enable Emerging Threats Open
suricata-update enable-source ptresearch/attackdetection  # PT Research rules
suricata-update update-sources           # Refresh source index
suricata-update --no-reload              # Update without live reload

Reload rules without restart

kill -USR2 $(pidof suricata)
# Or via Unix socket:
suricatasc -c reload-rules

Query eve.json for alerts

# Ransomware-related alerts in last hour
jq 'select(.event_type=="alert") | select(.alert.signature | test("ransomware|cobalt|mimikatz|psexec";"i"))' \
  /var/log/suricata/eve.json | jq -r '[.timestamp,.src_ip,.dest_ip,.alert.signature] | @tsv'
 
# Top 10 alert signatures
jq -r 'select(.event_type=="alert") | .alert.signature' /var/log/suricata/eve.json | \
  sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -10

RITA (Real Intelligence Threat Analytics)

Import Zeek logs and analyze

rita import --input /var/log/zeek/current/ --database my_network
rita analyze my_network

Beacon detection output

rita show-beacons my_network --human-readable
# Columns: Score | Source | Dest | Connections | Avg Bytes | TS Delta
# Score 0.9+ = high confidence beacon

DNS tunneling detection

rita show-exploded-dns my_network | head -20
rita show-long-connections my_network --human-readable

Splunk SPL — Ransomware Precursor Queries

Internal lateral movement via SMB/RDP/WinRM

index=zeek sourcetype=zeek_conn
  id.resp_p IN (445, 135, 3389, 5985, 5986)
  id.orig_h IN 10.0.0.0/8
  id.resp_h IN 10.0.0.0/8
| stats dc(id.resp_h) as targets count as conns by id.orig_h
| where targets >= 10
| sort -targets

Detect beaconing (regular connection intervals)

index=zeek sourcetype=zeek_conn
| bucket _time span=1m
| stats count as conns by id.orig_h, id.resp_h, id.resp_p, _time
| stats stdev(conns) as jitter avg(conns) as avg_conns count as minutes
    by id.orig_h, id.resp_h, id.resp_p
| where minutes > 10 AND jitter < 2 AND avg_conns > 0
| eval beacon_score = round(1 - (jitter / (avg_conns + 0.001)), 2)
| where beacon_score > 0.8
| sort -beacon_score

abuse.ch Threat Intelligence Feeds

Feodo Tracker (C2 IPs — Cobalt Strike, BazarLoader)

# CSV format: first_seen,dst_ip,dst_port,c2_status,malware
curl -s https://feodotracker.abuse.ch/downloads/ipblocklist.csv | \
  grep -v "^#" | awk -F, '{print $2}' > /tmp/c2_ips.txt

ThreatFox IOC API

# Query recent ransomware IOCs
curl -s -X POST https://threatfox-api.abuse.ch/api/v1/ \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"query":"get_iocs","days":7,"tag":"ransomware"}' | \
  jq '.data[] | [.ioc_value,.ioc_type,.malware,.confidence_level] | @tsv' -r

MITRE ATT&CK Ransomware Precursor Techniques

Technique ID Network Indicator
Remote Services: SMB/WMI T1021.002 SMB port 445 traffic to many hosts
OS Credential Dumping: DCSync T1003.006 DRS GetNCChanges from non-DC
Kerberoasting T1558.003 TGS-REQ for many SPNs
Command & Control T1071.001 Regular HTTPS beaconing
Lateral Tool Transfer T1570 Large SMB file writes across hosts
Network Service Scanning T1046 Port sweeps on 445/3389/135
standards.md1.7 KB

Standards & References - Detecting Ransomware Precursors

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Initial Access (TA0001)

  • T1078: Valid Accounts (compromised credentials from IABs)
  • T1133: External Remote Services (VPN/RDP exploitation)
  • T1566: Phishing (email-based initial access)

Command and Control (TA0011)

  • T1071.001: Application Layer Protocol: Web (HTTPS beacons)
  • T1071.004: Application Layer Protocol: DNS (DNS tunneling)
  • T1573: Encrypted Channel (C2 over TLS)
  • T1090: Proxy (redirectors and relay infrastructure)

Credential Access (TA0006)

  • T1558.003: Kerberoasting
  • T1003.006: DCSync
  • T1557: Adversary-in-the-Middle (NTLM relay)

Discovery (TA0007)

  • T1046: Network Service Discovery (port scanning)
  • T1018: Remote System Discovery (AD enumeration)
  • T1087: Account Discovery

Lateral Movement (TA0008)

  • T1021.002: Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
  • T1021.001: Remote Services: RDP
  • T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
  • T1569.002: System Services: Service Execution (PsExec)

Industry References

CISA Advisories

  • AA23-136A: #StopRansomware - BianLian Ransomware Group
  • AA23-158A: #StopRansomware - CL0P Ransomware Gang
  • AA24-131A: #StopRansomware - Black Basta
  • AA23-165A: Understanding Ransomware Threat Actors: LockBit

NIST

  • SP 800-94 Rev 1: Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
  • SP 800-86: Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response
  • IR 8374: Ransomware Risk Management

Threat Intelligence Sources

workflows.md2.6 KB

Workflows - Detecting Ransomware Precursors in Network

Workflow 1: Network Sensor Deployment

Start
  |
  v
[Identify network chokepoints] --> Core switches, internet edge, DC segments
  |
  v
[Deploy network TAPs or configure SPAN ports]
  |
  v
[Install Zeek sensor] --> Configure local.zeek with site-specific networks
  |
  v
[Install Suricata IDS] --> Load ET Open + custom ransomware rules
  |
  v
[Configure log forwarding to SIEM]
  |-- Zeek: conn.log, ssl.log, dns.log, smb.log, kerberos.log, notice.log
  |-- Suricata: eve.json (alerts, flow, dns, tls)
  |
  v
[Deploy RITA for beacon analysis] --> Schedule hourly Zeek log imports
  |
  v
[Load threat intelligence feeds] --> Feodo, ThreatFox, CISA KEV
  |
  v
[Validate detection with controlled Cobalt Strike beacon test]
  |
  v
End

Workflow 2: Alert Triage for Ransomware Precursors

Alert Received
  |
  v
[Classify alert type]
  |-- C2 Beaconing --> Priority: CRITICAL, SLA: 15 min
  |-- Credential Harvesting --> Priority: CRITICAL, SLA: 15 min
  |-- Internal Scanning --> Priority: HIGH, SLA: 30 min
  |-- Admin Share Access --> Priority: HIGH, SLA: 30 min
  |-- RDP Brute Force --> Priority: MEDIUM, SLA: 1 hour
  |-- DNS Anomaly --> Priority: LOW, SLA: 4 hours
  |
  v
[Check for correlated alerts on same source IP]
  |-- Multiple categories? --> Elevate to CRITICAL regardless
  |-- Single category? --> Proceed with category SLA
  |
  v
[Verify source host context]
  |-- Known admin workstation? --> Check if scheduled activity
  |-- Server? --> Check for authorized maintenance window
  |-- Standard workstation? --> Likely compromise indicator
  |
  v
[Decision: True Positive or False Positive?]
  |
  TP --> [Contain host: network isolation via NAC/EDR]
  |       |
  |       v
  |       [Trigger incident response playbook]
  |
  FP --> [Document FP reason]
          |
          v
          [Update detection rule to reduce FP rate]
          |
          v
          End

Workflow 3: Beacon Detection with RITA

Hourly Cron Job
  |
  v
[Import latest Zeek logs into RITA database]
  $ rita import /opt/zeek/logs/current rita-db
  |
  v
[Analyze beacons]
  $ rita show-beacons rita-db --human-readable
  |
  v
[Filter results by beacon score > 0.7]
  |
  v
[For each high-score beacon:]
  |-- Look up destination IP in threat intel
  |-- Check JA3/JA4 hash against known C2 fingerprints
  |-- Verify beacon interval and jitter pattern
  |
  v
[Score > 0.9 AND matches threat intel?]
  |
  Yes --> [Generate CRITICAL alert]
  |
  No --> [Score > 0.7?]
          |
          Yes --> [Generate MEDIUM alert for analyst review]
          |
          No --> [Log and continue monitoring]
  |
  v
End

Scripts 2

agent.py7.2 KB
Display-only source. This catalog never executes bundled scripts.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Agent for detecting ransomware precursor activity in network traffic and logs."""

import argparse
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
from datetime import datetime, timezone


RANSOMWARE_PORTS = {445, 3389, 4444, 5985, 5986, 135, 139, 8443}
SUSPICIOUS_PROCESSES = [
    "vssadmin.exe", "wmic.exe", "bcdedit.exe", "wbadmin.exe",
    "powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "certutil.exe", "bitsadmin.exe",
    "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "cscript.exe",
]
SHADOW_COPY_PATTERNS = [
    r"vssadmin\s+delete\s+shadows",
    r"wmic\s+shadowcopy\s+delete",
    r"bcdedit.*recoveryenabled.*no",
    r"wbadmin\s+delete\s+(catalog|systemstatebackup)",
]
SMB_LATERAL_PATTERNS = [
    r"\\\\[\d\.]+\\(C\$|ADMIN\$|IPC\$)",
    r"psexec",
    r"wmiexec",
]


def parse_zeek_conn_log(log_path):
    """Parse Zeek conn.log for suspicious network connections."""
    alerts = []
    try:
        with open(log_path, "r") as f:
            for line in f:
                if line.startswith("#"):
                    continue
                fields = line.strip().split("\t")
                if len(fields) < 7:
                    continue
                src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, dst_port = fields[2], fields[3], fields[4], fields[5]
                try:
                    dp = int(dst_port)
                except ValueError:
                    continue
                if dp in RANSOMWARE_PORTS:
                    alerts.append({
                        "type": "suspicious_port",
                        "src": src_ip,
                        "dst": dst_ip,
                        "port": dp,
                        "detail": f"Connection to ransomware-associated port {dp}",
                    })
    except FileNotFoundError:
        print(f"[!] Log file not found: {log_path}")
    return alerts


def analyze_event_logs_windows():
    """Check Windows event logs for ransomware precursors."""
    alerts = []
    queries = [
        ("Shadow copy deletion", "Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System';Id=7036} "
         "| Where-Object {$_.Message -match 'Volume Shadow Copy'} | Select-Object -First 10 "
         "| ConvertTo-Json"),
        ("RDP brute force", "Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security';Id=4625} "
         "| Select-Object -First 20 | Group-Object {$_.Properties[5].Value} "
         "| Where-Object {$_.Count -gt 5} | ConvertTo-Json"),
        ("Service installs", "Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System';Id=7045} "
         "| Select-Object -First 10 | ConvertTo-Json"),
    ]
    for name, ps_cmd in queries:
        try:
            result = subprocess.check_output(
                ["powershell", "-NoProfile", "-Command", ps_cmd],
                text=True, errors="replace", timeout=30
            )
            if result.strip():
                data = json.loads(result) if result.strip().startswith(("[", "{")) else result
                alerts.append({"check": name, "findings": data})
        except (subprocess.SubprocessError, json.JSONDecodeError):
            pass
    return alerts


def scan_process_list():
    """Check running processes for ransomware tooling."""
    suspicious = []
    if sys.platform == "win32":
        try:
            out = subprocess.check_output(
                ["tasklist", "/FO", "CSV", "/NH"], text=True, errors="replace",
                timeout=120,
            )
            for line in out.splitlines():
                parts = line.strip('"').split('","')
                if parts:
                    pname = parts[0].lower()
                    for sp in SUSPICIOUS_PROCESSES:
                        if pname == sp.lower():
                            suspicious.append({"process": pname, "pid": parts[1] if len(parts) > 1 else "?"})
        except subprocess.SubprocessError:
            pass
    else:
        try:
            out = subprocess.check_output(["ps", "-eo", "pid,comm", "--no-headers"], text=True, timeout=120)
            for line in out.splitlines():
                parts = line.split(None, 1)
                if len(parts) == 2:
                    for sp in SUSPICIOUS_PROCESSES:
                        if parts[1].strip().lower() == sp.replace(".exe", ""):
                            suspicious.append({"process": parts[1].strip(), "pid": parts[0]})
        except subprocess.SubprocessError:
            pass
    return suspicious


def check_file_encryption_activity(directory, threshold=50):
    """Detect mass file renaming or new encrypted extensions."""
    suspicious_exts = {".encrypted", ".locked", ".crypto", ".crypt", ".enc",
                       ".locky", ".cerber", ".zepto", ".thor", ".aaa"}
    findings = []
    count = 0
    try:
        for root, _, files in os.walk(directory):
            for f in files:
                ext = os.path.splitext(f)[1].lower()
                if ext in suspicious_exts:
                    count += 1
                    if count <= 10:
                        findings.append(os.path.join(root, f))
            if count >= threshold:
                break
    except PermissionError:
        pass
    return {"encrypted_file_count": count, "samples": findings, "threshold_exceeded": count >= threshold}


def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="Detect ransomware precursor activity in network and host"
    )
    parser.add_argument("--conn-log", help="Path to Zeek conn.log")
    parser.add_argument("--scan-dir", help="Directory to scan for encrypted files")
    parser.add_argument("--check-processes", action="store_true", help="Scan running processes")
    parser.add_argument("--windows-logs", action="store_true", help="Check Windows event logs")
    parser.add_argument("--output", "-o", help="Output JSON report path")
    args = parser.parse_args()

    print("[*] Ransomware Precursor Detection Agent")
    report = {"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(), "findings": {}}

    if args.conn_log:
        alerts = parse_zeek_conn_log(args.conn_log)
        report["findings"]["network"] = alerts
        print(f"[*] Network alerts: {len(alerts)}")

    if args.check_processes:
        procs = scan_process_list()
        report["findings"]["suspicious_processes"] = procs
        print(f"[*] Suspicious processes: {len(procs)}")

    if args.windows_logs and sys.platform == "win32":
        events = analyze_event_logs_windows()
        report["findings"]["windows_events"] = events
        print(f"[*] Windows event findings: {len(events)}")

    if args.scan_dir:
        enc = check_file_encryption_activity(args.scan_dir)
        report["findings"]["encryption_activity"] = enc
        print(f"[*] Encrypted files found: {enc['encrypted_file_count']}")

    total = sum(
        len(v) if isinstance(v, list) else (1 if isinstance(v, dict) and v.get("threshold_exceeded") else 0)
        for v in report["findings"].values()
    )
    report["risk_level"] = "CRITICAL" if total >= 10 else "HIGH" if total >= 5 else "MEDIUM" if total > 0 else "LOW"
    print(f"[*] Overall risk: {report['risk_level']}")

    if args.output:
        with open(args.output, "w") as f:
            json.dump(report, f, indent=2)
        print(f"[*] Report saved to {args.output}")
    else:
        print(json.dumps(report, indent=2))


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
process.py19.0 KB
Display-only source. This catalog never executes bundled scripts.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Ransomware Precursor Detection Engine

Analyzes network logs (Zeek format) to detect ransomware precursor patterns:
- C2 beaconing detection via statistical interval analysis
- Internal reconnaissance scanning
- Kerberoasting and credential harvesting indicators
- Admin share enumeration
- Data staging via large SMB transfers

Reads Zeek TSV logs and generates structured alerts.
"""

import csv
import json
import math
import os
import sys
import statistics
from collections import defaultdict
from dataclasses import dataclass, field, asdict
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Optional


@dataclass
class PrecursorAlert:
    alert_id: str
    timestamp: str
    source_ip: str
    dest_ip: str
    category: str
    confidence: str
    kill_chain_phase: str
    description: str
    mitre_technique: str
    evidence: list = field(default_factory=list)


class BeaconDetector:
    """Detects C2 beaconing by analyzing connection interval patterns."""

    def __init__(self, min_connections: int = 20, beacon_score_threshold: float = 0.7):
        self.min_connections = min_connections
        self.beacon_score_threshold = beacon_score_threshold
        self.connections = defaultdict(list)

    def add_connection(self, src_ip: str, dst_ip: str, timestamp: float, orig_bytes: int, resp_bytes: int):
        key = (src_ip, dst_ip)
        self.connections[key].append({
            "ts": timestamp,
            "orig_bytes": orig_bytes,
            "resp_bytes": resp_bytes,
        })

    def calculate_beacon_score(self, timestamps: list) -> dict:
        """Calculate beacon score based on connection interval regularity."""
        if len(timestamps) < self.min_connections:
            return {"score": 0.0, "interval": 0, "jitter": 0}

        sorted_ts = sorted(timestamps)
        intervals = [sorted_ts[i + 1] - sorted_ts[i] for i in range(len(sorted_ts) - 1)]

        if not intervals:
            return {"score": 0.0, "interval": 0, "jitter": 0}

        median_interval = statistics.median(intervals)
        if median_interval == 0:
            return {"score": 0.0, "interval": 0, "jitter": 0}

        # Calculate coefficient of variation (lower = more regular = more likely beacon)
        try:
            stdev = statistics.stdev(intervals)
            cv = stdev / median_interval
        except statistics.StatisticsError:
            cv = 0

        # Beacon score: inverse of coefficient of variation, capped at 1.0
        # Perfect beacon (cv=0) scores 1.0, high variation scores low
        if cv == 0:
            score = 1.0
        else:
            score = max(0, min(1.0, 1.0 - cv))

        # Penalize very short intervals (likely legitimate keep-alives under 5s)
        if median_interval < 5:
            score *= 0.5

        # Penalize very long intervals (over 1 hour - less likely active C2)
        if median_interval > 3600:
            score *= 0.7

        return {
            "score": round(score, 3),
            "interval": round(median_interval, 1),
            "jitter": round(stdev, 1) if stdev else 0,
            "connection_count": len(timestamps),
        }

    def detect(self) -> list:
        """Detect beaconing patterns in collected connections."""
        alerts = []
        for (src_ip, dst_ip), conns in self.connections.items():
            timestamps = [c["ts"] for c in conns]
            result = self.calculate_beacon_score(timestamps)

            if result["score"] >= self.beacon_score_threshold:
                # Check for consistent payload sizes (another beacon indicator)
                orig_sizes = [c["orig_bytes"] for c in conns if c["orig_bytes"] > 0]
                size_consistency = 0.0
                if len(orig_sizes) >= 5:
                    try:
                        size_cv = statistics.stdev(orig_sizes) / statistics.mean(orig_sizes)
                        size_consistency = max(0, 1.0 - size_cv)
                    except (statistics.StatisticsError, ZeroDivisionError):
                        pass

                combined_score = (result["score"] * 0.7) + (size_consistency * 0.3)

                if combined_score >= self.beacon_score_threshold:
                    confidence = "High" if combined_score >= 0.9 else "Medium"
                    alert = PrecursorAlert(
                        alert_id=f"BEACON-{src_ip}-{dst_ip}",
                        timestamp=datetime.fromtimestamp(max(timestamps)).isoformat(),
                        source_ip=src_ip,
                        dest_ip=dst_ip,
                        category="C2 Beaconing",
                        confidence=confidence,
                        kill_chain_phase="Command and Control",
                        description=(
                            f"Beaconing pattern detected: {result['connection_count']} connections "
                            f"at {result['interval']}s intervals (jitter: {result['jitter']}s, "
                            f"beacon score: {combined_score:.3f})"
                        ),
                        mitre_technique="T1071 - Application Layer Protocol",
                        evidence=[
                            f"Beacon score: {combined_score:.3f}",
                            f"Interval: {result['interval']}s",
                            f"Jitter: {result['jitter']}s",
                            f"Payload size consistency: {size_consistency:.3f}",
                            f"Connections: {result['connection_count']}",
                        ],
                    )
                    alerts.append(alert)
        return alerts


class ScanDetector:
    """Detects internal reconnaissance scanning."""

    def __init__(self, unique_dest_threshold: int = 30, time_window_seconds: int = 300):
        self.threshold = unique_dest_threshold
        self.window = time_window_seconds
        self.connections = defaultdict(list)

    def add_connection(self, src_ip: str, dst_ip: str, dst_port: int, timestamp: float):
        self.connections[src_ip].append({
            "dst_ip": dst_ip,
            "dst_port": dst_port,
            "ts": timestamp,
        })

    def detect(self) -> list:
        alerts = []
        for src_ip, conns in self.connections.items():
            sorted_conns = sorted(conns, key=lambda c: c["ts"])

            # Sliding window analysis
            window_start = 0
            for window_end in range(len(sorted_conns)):
                while (sorted_conns[window_end]["ts"] - sorted_conns[window_start]["ts"]) > self.window:
                    window_start += 1

                window_conns = sorted_conns[window_start:window_end + 1]
                unique_dests = set(c["dst_ip"] for c in window_conns)
                unique_ports = set(c["dst_port"] for c in window_conns)

                if len(unique_dests) >= self.threshold:
                    alert = PrecursorAlert(
                        alert_id=f"SCAN-{src_ip}-{int(sorted_conns[window_start]['ts'])}",
                        timestamp=datetime.fromtimestamp(sorted_conns[window_end]["ts"]).isoformat(),
                        source_ip=src_ip,
                        dest_ip="Multiple",
                        category="Internal Reconnaissance",
                        confidence="High" if len(unique_dests) >= self.threshold * 2 else "Medium",
                        kill_chain_phase="Discovery",
                        description=(
                            f"Internal scan: {len(unique_dests)} unique destinations on "
                            f"{len(unique_ports)} ports within {self.window}s window"
                        ),
                        mitre_technique="T1046 - Network Service Discovery",
                        evidence=[
                            f"Unique destinations: {len(unique_dests)}",
                            f"Unique ports: {sorted(unique_ports)}",
                            f"Total connections: {len(window_conns)}",
                            f"Time window: {self.window}s",
                        ],
                    )
                    alerts.append(alert)
                    break  # One alert per source IP per window

        return alerts


class CredentialHarvestDetector:
    """Detects Kerberoasting and credential harvesting patterns."""

    def __init__(self, kerberoast_threshold: int = 5):
        self.threshold = kerberoast_threshold
        self.tgs_requests = defaultdict(list)
        self.smb_failures = defaultdict(int)

    def add_kerberos_event(self, src_ip: str, service_name: str, encryption_type: str, timestamp: float):
        self.tgs_requests[src_ip].append({
            "service": service_name,
            "enc_type": encryption_type,
            "ts": timestamp,
        })

    def add_smb_failure(self, src_ip: str, dst_ip: str):
        self.smb_failures[src_ip] += 1

    def detect(self) -> list:
        alerts = []

        # Kerberoasting: multiple TGS requests for unique services with RC4 encryption
        for src_ip, requests in self.tgs_requests.items():
            rc4_requests = [r for r in requests if "rc4" in r.get("enc_type", "").lower()
                          or "23" in str(r.get("enc_type", ""))]
            unique_services = set(r["service"] for r in rc4_requests)

            if len(unique_services) >= self.threshold:
                alert = PrecursorAlert(
                    alert_id=f"KERB-{src_ip}",
                    timestamp=datetime.fromtimestamp(max(r["ts"] for r in rc4_requests)).isoformat(),
                    source_ip=src_ip,
                    dest_ip="Domain Controller",
                    category="Kerberoasting",
                    confidence="High",
                    kill_chain_phase="Credential Access",
                    description=(
                        f"Possible Kerberoasting: {len(unique_services)} unique service ticket "
                        f"requests with RC4 encryption from single host"
                    ),
                    mitre_technique="T1558.003 - Kerberoasting",
                    evidence=[
                        f"Unique services targeted: {len(unique_services)}",
                        f"RC4 encryption requests: {len(rc4_requests)}",
                        f"Services: {list(unique_services)[:10]}",
                    ],
                )
                alerts.append(alert)

        # SMB brute force
        for src_ip, count in self.smb_failures.items():
            if count >= 10:
                alert = PrecursorAlert(
                    alert_id=f"SMB-BRUTE-{src_ip}",
                    timestamp=datetime.now().isoformat(),
                    source_ip=src_ip,
                    dest_ip="Multiple",
                    category="SMB Brute Force",
                    confidence="Medium",
                    kill_chain_phase="Credential Access",
                    description=f"SMB authentication failures: {count} failed attempts",
                    mitre_technique="T1110 - Brute Force",
                    evidence=[f"Failed SMB auth count: {count}"],
                )
                alerts.append(alert)

        return alerts


class AdminShareDetector:
    """Detects suspicious access to administrative shares (C$, ADMIN$, IPC$)."""

    def __init__(self, threshold: int = 5):
        self.threshold = threshold
        self.share_access = defaultdict(lambda: defaultdict(set))

    def add_share_access(self, src_ip: str, dst_ip: str, share_name: str, timestamp: float):
        admin_shares = {"ADMIN$", "C$", "IPC$", "D$", "E$"}
        normalized_share = share_name.split("\\")[-1].upper()
        if normalized_share in admin_shares:
            self.share_access[src_ip][normalized_share].add(dst_ip)

    def detect(self) -> list:
        alerts = []
        for src_ip, shares in self.share_access.items():
            total_targets = set()
            for share, targets in shares.items():
                total_targets.update(targets)

            if len(total_targets) >= self.threshold:
                alert = PrecursorAlert(
                    alert_id=f"ADMINSHARE-{src_ip}",
                    timestamp=datetime.now().isoformat(),
                    source_ip=src_ip,
                    dest_ip="Multiple",
                    category="Admin Share Enumeration",
                    confidence="High" if len(total_targets) >= self.threshold * 2 else "Medium",
                    kill_chain_phase="Lateral Movement",
                    description=(
                        f"Admin share access to {len(total_targets)} hosts: "
                        f"shares accessed: {list(shares.keys())}"
                    ),
                    mitre_technique="T1021.002 - SMB/Windows Admin Shares",
                    evidence=[
                        f"Unique targets: {len(total_targets)}",
                        f"Shares accessed: {dict((s, len(t)) for s, t in shares.items())}",
                    ],
                )
                alerts.append(alert)

        return alerts


class RansomwarePrecursorEngine:
    """Orchestrates all detection modules."""

    def __init__(self):
        self.beacon_detector = BeaconDetector()
        self.scan_detector = ScanDetector()
        self.cred_detector = CredentialHarvestDetector()
        self.share_detector = AdminShareDetector()
        self.alerts = []

    def load_zeek_conn_log(self, filepath: str):
        """Parse Zeek conn.log for beacon and scan detection."""
        with open(filepath, "r") as f:
            for line in f:
                if line.startswith("#"):
                    continue
                fields = line.strip().split("\t")
                if len(fields) < 20:
                    continue
                try:
                    ts = float(fields[0])
                    src_ip = fields[2]
                    src_port = int(fields[3]) if fields[3] != "-" else 0
                    dst_ip = fields[4]
                    dst_port = int(fields[5]) if fields[5] != "-" else 0
                    proto = fields[6]
                    orig_bytes = int(fields[9]) if fields[9] != "-" else 0
                    resp_bytes = int(fields[10]) if fields[10] != "-" else 0

                    # Feed to beacon detector (external destinations)
                    if not self._is_internal(dst_ip):
                        self.beacon_detector.add_connection(src_ip, dst_ip, ts, orig_bytes, resp_bytes)

                    # Feed to scan detector (internal destinations)
                    if self._is_internal(src_ip) and self._is_internal(dst_ip):
                        self.scan_detector.add_connection(src_ip, dst_ip, dst_port, ts)
                except (ValueError, IndexError):
                    continue

    def _is_internal(self, ip: str) -> bool:
        """Check if IP is in RFC1918 private range."""
        parts = ip.split(".")
        if len(parts) != 4:
            return False
        try:
            first = int(parts[0])
            second = int(parts[1])
            if first == 10:
                return True
            if first == 172 and 16 <= second <= 31:
                return True
            if first == 192 and second == 168:
                return True
        except ValueError:
            pass
        return False

    def run_detection(self) -> list:
        """Run all detectors and return combined alerts."""
        self.alerts = []
        self.alerts.extend(self.beacon_detector.detect())
        self.alerts.extend(self.scan_detector.detect())
        self.alerts.extend(self.cred_detector.detect())
        self.alerts.extend(self.share_detector.detect())

        # Sort by confidence (High first)
        confidence_order = {"High": 0, "Medium": 1, "Low": 2}
        self.alerts.sort(key=lambda a: confidence_order.get(a.confidence, 3))

        return self.alerts

    def generate_report(self) -> str:
        """Generate formatted detection report."""
        if not self.alerts:
            self.run_detection()

        lines = []
        lines.append("=" * 70)
        lines.append("RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR DETECTION REPORT")
        lines.append("=" * 70)
        lines.append(f"Generated: {datetime.now().isoformat()}")
        lines.append(f"Total Alerts: {len(self.alerts)}")

        by_category = defaultdict(list)
        for alert in self.alerts:
            by_category[alert.category].append(alert)

        lines.append(f"\nAlert Categories:")
        for cat, cat_alerts in sorted(by_category.items()):
            lines.append(f"  - {cat}: {len(cat_alerts)}")

        lines.append("")
        for i, alert in enumerate(self.alerts, 1):
            lines.append("-" * 50)
            lines.append(f"Alert #{i}: {alert.alert_id}")
            lines.append(f"  Category: {alert.category}")
            lines.append(f"  Confidence: {alert.confidence}")
            lines.append(f"  Kill Chain: {alert.kill_chain_phase}")
            lines.append(f"  Source: {alert.source_ip}")
            lines.append(f"  Destination: {alert.dest_ip}")
            lines.append(f"  MITRE: {alert.mitre_technique}")
            lines.append(f"  Description: {alert.description}")
            lines.append(f"  Evidence:")
            for e in alert.evidence:
                lines.append(f"    - {e}")

        lines.append("")
        lines.append("=" * 70)
        return "\n".join(lines)


def main():
    """Run detection engine with sample data or Zeek log file."""
    engine = RansomwarePrecursorEngine()

    # Check for Zeek conn.log argument
    if len(sys.argv) > 1:
        log_file = sys.argv[1]
        if os.path.exists(log_file):
            print(f"Loading Zeek conn.log: {log_file}")
            engine.load_zeek_conn_log(log_file)
        else:
            print(f"File not found: {log_file}")
            sys.exit(1)
    else:
        # Demo with simulated data
        print("No Zeek log provided. Running with simulated beacon data...")
        import time

        base_time = time.time() - 3600  # 1 hour ago

        # Simulate Cobalt Strike beacon (60-second interval)
        for i in range(40):
            jitter = (i % 3) * 2  # Small jitter
            engine.beacon_detector.add_connection(
                "10.1.5.42", "185.220.101.42",
                base_time + (i * 60) + jitter,
                orig_bytes=48, resp_bytes=128,
            )

        # Simulate internal port scan
        for i in range(50):
            engine.scan_detector.add_connection(
                "10.1.5.42", f"10.1.5.{100 + i}", 445,
                base_time + 1800 + (i * 2),
            )

        # Simulate Kerberoasting
        for i in range(8):
            engine.cred_detector.add_kerberos_event(
                "10.1.5.42", f"MSSQLSvc/sql{i}.corp.local:1433",
                "rc4-hmac", base_time + 2000 + (i * 5),
            )

        # Simulate admin share access
        for i in range(12):
            engine.share_detector.add_share_access(
                "10.1.5.42", f"10.1.5.{200 + i}", "ADMIN$",
                base_time + 2500 + (i * 10),
            )

    report = engine.generate_report()
    print(report)

    # Export alerts as JSON
    alerts_json = [asdict(a) for a in engine.alerts]
    output_path = Path(__file__).parent / "precursor_alerts.json"
    with open(output_path, "w") as f:
        json.dump(alerts_json, f, indent=2)
    print(f"\nAlerts exported to: {output_path}")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

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