npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-SkillsMITRE ATT&CK
NIST CSF 2.0
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- SOC analysts investigate alerts related to Windows authentication, process execution, or AD changes
- Detection engineers build SPL queries for Windows-based threat detection
- Incident responders need forensic timelines of Windows endpoint or domain controller activity
- Periodic threat hunting targets Windows-specific ATT&CK techniques
Do not use for Linux/macOS endpoint analysis or network-only investigations.
Prerequisites
- Splunk with Windows Event Log data ingested (sourcetype
WinEventLog:Security,WinEventLog:System,XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational) - Sysmon deployed on endpoints with SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong configuration
- CIM data model acceleration for Endpoint and Authentication data models
- Knowledge of Windows Security Event IDs and Sysmon event types
Workflow
Step 1: Authentication Attack Detection
Brute Force Detection (EventCode 4625 — Failed Logon):
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625
| stats count, dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, values(TargetUserName) AS targeted_users
by src_ip, Logon_Type, Status
| where count > 20
| eval attack_type = case(
Logon_Type=3, "Network Brute Force",
Logon_Type=10, "RDP Brute Force",
Logon_Type=2, "Interactive Brute Force",
1=1, "Other"
)
| eval status_meaning = case(
Status="0xc000006d", "Bad Username or Password",
Status="0xc000006a", "Incorrect Password (valid user)",
Status="0xc0000234", "Account Locked Out",
Status="0xc0000072", "Account Disabled",
1=1, Status
)
| sort - count
| table src_ip, attack_type, status_meaning, count, unique_users, targeted_usersPassword Spray Detection:
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3
| bin _time span=10m
| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, count AS total_attempts,
values(TargetUserName) AS users_targeted by src_ip, _time
| where unique_users > 10 AND total_attempts < unique_users * 3
| eval spray_confidence = if(unique_users > 25, "HIGH", "MEDIUM")Successful Logon After Failures (Compromise Indicator):
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security"
(EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624) src_ip!="127.0.0.1"
| sort _time
| stats earliest(_time) AS first_seen, latest(_time) AS last_seen,
sum(eval(if(EventCode=4625,1,0))) AS failures,
sum(eval(if(EventCode=4624,1,0))) AS successes
by src_ip, TargetUserName, ComputerName
| where failures > 10 AND successes > 0
| eval time_to_success = round((last_seen - first_seen)/60, 1)
| sort - failuresStep 2: Privilege Escalation Detection
New Admin Account Created (T1136.001):
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4720
| join TargetUserName type=left [
search index=wineventlog EventCode=4732 TargetUserName="Administrators"
| rename MemberName AS TargetUserName
]
| table _time, SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, ComputerName
| eval alert = "New account created and added to Administrators group"Special Privileges Assigned (EventCode 4672):
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4672
SubjectUserName!="SYSTEM" SubjectUserName!="LOCAL SERVICE" SubjectUserName!="NETWORK SERVICE"
| stats count, values(PrivilegeList) AS privileges by SubjectUserName, ComputerName
| where count > 0
| search privileges IN ("SeDebugPrivilege", "SeTcbPrivilege", "SeBackupPrivilege",
"SeRestorePrivilege", "SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege")Token Manipulation Detection (T1134):
index=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe"
GrantedAccess IN ("0x1010", "0x1038", "0x1fffff", "0x40")
| stats count by SourceImage, SourceUser, Computer, GrantedAccess
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(svchost|csrss|wininit|MsMpEng|CrowdStrike)")
| sort - countStep 3: Persistence Mechanism Detection
Scheduled Task Creation (T1053.005):
index=wineventlog (sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4698)
OR (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image="*\\schtasks.exe")
| eval task_info = coalesce(TaskContent, CommandLine)
| search task_info="*powershell*" OR task_info="*cmd*" OR task_info="*http*" OR task_info="*\\Temp\\*"
| table _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, TaskName, task_infoRegistry Run Key Modification (T1547.001):
index=sysmon EventCode=13
TargetObject IN (
"*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
"*\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*",
"*\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\\*",
"*\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\*"
)
| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetObject, Details
| where NOT match(Image, "(explorer\.exe|msiexec\.exe|setup\.exe)")
| sort - countWMI Event Subscription (T1546.003):
index=sysmon EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21
| stats count by Computer, Operation, Consumer, EventNamespace
| where count > 0Step 4: Lateral Movement Detection
Remote Service Exploitation (T1021.002 — SMB/Windows Admin Shares):
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3
| stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_destinations, values(ComputerName) AS targets
by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where unique_destinations > 3
| sort - unique_destinations
| table src_ip, TargetUserName, unique_destinations, targetsPsExec Detection (T1021.002):
index=sysmon EventCode=1
(Image="*\\psexec.exe" OR Image="*\\psexesvc.exe"
OR ParentImage="*\\psexesvc.exe"
OR OriginalFileName="psexec.c")
| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLineRDP Lateral Movement (T1021.001):
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=10
| stats count, dc(ComputerName) AS rdp_targets, values(ComputerName) AS destinations
by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where rdp_targets > 2
| sort - rdp_targetsStep 5: Build Forensic Timeline
Create comprehensive timeline for a compromised host:
(index=wineventlog OR index=sysmon) Computer="WORKSTATION-042"
earliest="2024-03-14T00:00:00" latest="2024-03-16T00:00:00"
| eval event_description = case(
EventCode=4624, "Logon: ".TargetUserName." (Type ".Logon_Type.")",
EventCode=4625, "Failed Logon: ".TargetUserName,
EventCode=4688 OR (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:*Sysmon*" AND EventCode=1),
"Process: ".Image." CMD: ".CommandLine,
EventCode=4698, "Scheduled Task: ".TaskName,
EventCode=3, "Network: ".DestinationIp.":".DestinationPort,
EventCode=11, "File Created: ".TargetFilename,
EventCode=13, "Registry: ".TargetObject,
1=1, "Event ".EventCode
)
| sort _time
| table _time, EventCode, event_description, User, src_ipStep 6: Create Lookup Tables for Enrichment
Build reference lookups for Windows Event ID context:
| inputlookup windows_eventcode_lookup.csv
| table EventCode, Description, ATT_CK_Technique, SeverityIf lookup doesn't exist, create it:
EventCode,Description,ATT_CK_Technique,Severity
4624,Successful Logon,T1078,Informational
4625,Failed Logon,T1110,Low
4648,Explicit Credential Logon,T1078,Medium
4672,Special Privileges Assigned,T1134,Medium
4688,New Process Created,T1059,Informational
4698,Scheduled Task Created,T1053.005,Medium
4720,User Account Created,T1136.001,High
4732,Member Added to Security Group,T1098,High
4768,Kerberos TGT Requested,T1558,Informational
4769,Kerberos Service Ticket,T1558.003,Low
4771,Kerberos Pre-Auth Failed,T1110,LowKey Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| EventCode 4624 | Successful logon event — Logon_Type 2 (interactive), 3 (network), 10 (RDP), 7 (unlock) |
| EventCode 4625 | Failed logon event — Status code indicates failure reason (bad password, account locked, disabled) |
| Sysmon EventCode 1 | Process creation with full command line, parent process, and hash information |
| Sysmon EventCode 3 | Network connection initiated by a process — source/dest IP, port, and process context |
| Logon Type 3 | Network logon (SMB, WMI, PowerShell Remoting) — key indicator of lateral movement |
| Logon Type 10 | Remote interactive logon via RDP/Terminal Services |
Tools & Systems
- Splunk Enterprise: SIEM platform with SPL query engine for Windows event log analysis and correlation
- Sysmon (System Monitor): Microsoft Sysinternals tool providing detailed process, network, and file activity logging
- Splunk CIM: Common Information Model mapping Windows events to normalized fields for cross-source queries
- Windows Event Forwarding (WEF): Built-in Windows mechanism for centralizing event logs to a collector server
Common Scenarios
- Kerberoasting (T1558.003): Detect EventCode 4769 with encryption type 0x17 (RC4) for non-standard service accounts
- DCSync (T1003.006): Detect EventCode 4662 with DS-Replication-Get-Changes from non-DC sources
- Golden Ticket (T1558.001): Detect EventCode 4769 with abnormal ticket properties (long lifetime, non-standard encryption)
- Pass-the-Hash (T1550.002): Detect EventCode 4624 Logon_Type 3 with NTLM authentication from unexpected sources
- DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002): Sysmon EventCode 7 showing unsigned DLLs loaded by legitimate processes
Output Format
WINDOWS EVENT LOG ANALYSIS — HOST: WORKSTATION-042
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Period: 2024-03-14 to 2024-03-15
Events: 12,847 total (Security: 9,231 | Sysmon: 3,616)
Authentication Summary:
Successful Logons (4624): 487 (Type 3: 312, Type 10: 45, Type 2: 130)
Failed Logons (4625): 847 (from 192.168.1.105 — BRUTE FORCE)
Explicit Creds (4648): 12
Suspicious Findings:
[HIGH] 847 failed logons followed by success at 14:35 from 192.168.1.105
[HIGH] New user "backdoor_admin" created (4720) at 14:38
[HIGH] User added to Administrators group (4732) at 14:38
[MEDIUM] schtasks.exe creating persistence task at 14:42
[MEDIUM] PowerShell encoded command execution at 14:45
ATT&CK Mapping:
T1110.001 — Password Guessing (847 failed logons)
T1136.001 — Local Account Creation (backdoor_admin)
T1053.005 — Scheduled Task (persistence)
T1059.001 — PowerShell (encoded execution)References and resources
Everything below is rendered for inspection. Script files are read-only and never run.
References 1
api-reference.md2.0 KB
API Reference: Analyzing Windows Event Logs in Splunk
splunk-sdk Connection
import splunklib.client as client
service = client.connect(host="splunk", port=8089, username="admin", password="pass")Key Windows Security Event IDs
| EventCode | Description | ATT&CK Technique |
|---|---|---|
| 4624 | Successful logon | T1078 |
| 4625 | Failed logon | T1110 |
| 4648 | Explicit credential logon | T1078 |
| 4672 | Special privileges assigned | T1134 |
| 4688 | New process created | T1059 |
| 4698 | Scheduled task created | T1053.005 |
| 4720 | User account created | T1136.001 |
| 4732 | Member added to security group | T1098 |
| 4768 | Kerberos TGT requested | T1558 |
| 4769 | Kerberos service ticket | T1558.003 |
Key Sysmon Event IDs
| EventCode | Description |
|---|---|
| 1 | Process creation (full command line, hashes) |
| 3 | Network connection |
| 7 | Image loaded (DLL) |
| 10 | Process access (LSASS credential dumping) |
| 11 | File creation |
| 13 | Registry value set |
| 22 | DNS query |
Logon Types
| Type | Description | Context |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | Interactive | Local console logon |
| 3 | Network | SMB, WMI, PowerShell Remoting |
| 7 | Unlock | Workstation unlock |
| 9 | NewCredentials | runas /netonly |
| 10 | RemoteInteractive | RDP logon |
SPL Detection Patterns
# Brute force detection
index=wineventlog EventCode=4625 | stats count by src_ip | where count > 20
# Kerberoasting (T1558.003)
index=wineventlog EventCode=4769 Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17
| where ServiceName != "krbtgt"
# DCSync detection (T1003.006)
index=wineventlog EventCode=4662
| where ObjectType="*domainDNS*"
| search Properties="*Replicating Directory Changes*"References
- splunk-sdk: https://pypi.org/project/splunk-sdk/
- Splunk CIM: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Overview
- Windows Security Log Encyclopedia: https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/
Scripts 1
agent.py6.9 KB
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Agent for analyzing Windows event logs in Splunk for SOC operations."""
import os
import json
import argparse
from datetime import datetime
import splunklib.client as client
import splunklib.results as results
def connect(host, port, username, password):
"""Connect to Splunk Enterprise."""
return client.connect(
host=host, port=port, username=username, password=password, autologin=True
)
def search(service, query, earliest="-24h", latest="now"):
"""Run a blocking Splunk search and return results."""
job = service.jobs.create(
f"search {query}",
**{"earliest_time": earliest, "latest_time": latest, "exec_mode": "blocking"}
)
reader = results.JSONResultsReader(job.results(output_mode="json"))
rows = [r for r in reader if isinstance(r, dict)]
job.cancel()
return rows
def detect_brute_force(service, earliest="-24h", threshold=20):
"""Detect brute force via EventCode 4625 with logon type classification."""
query = (
'index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625 '
"| stats count, dc(TargetUserName) as unique_users, "
"values(TargetUserName) as targeted_users by src_ip, Logon_Type, Status "
f"| where count > {threshold} "
'| eval attack_type=case(Logon_Type=3,"Network",Logon_Type=10,"RDP",'
'Logon_Type=2,"Interactive",1=1,"Other") '
"| sort -count"
)
return search(service, query, earliest)
def detect_password_spray(service, earliest="-24h"):
"""Detect password spray attacks targeting many accounts from one source."""
query = (
'index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 '
"| bin _time span=10m "
"| stats dc(TargetUserName) as unique_users, count as total by src_ip, _time "
"| where unique_users > 10 AND total < unique_users * 3 "
'| eval confidence=if(unique_users > 25, "HIGH", "MEDIUM")'
)
return search(service, query, earliest)
def detect_new_admin_accounts(service, earliest="-7d"):
"""Detect new accounts added to the Administrators group (T1136.001)."""
query = (
'index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4720 '
'| join TargetUserName type=left [search index=wineventlog EventCode=4732 '
'TargetUserName="Administrators" | rename MemberName as TargetUserName] '
"| table _time, SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, ComputerName"
)
return search(service, query, earliest)
def detect_lsass_access(service, earliest="-24h"):
"""Detect LSASS credential dumping via Sysmon Event 10 (T1003.001)."""
query = (
'index=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage="*\\\\lsass.exe" '
'GrantedAccess IN ("0x1010","0x1038","0x1fffff","0x40") '
"| stats count by SourceImage, SourceUser, Computer, GrantedAccess "
'| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(svchost|csrss|wininit|MsMpEng)") '
"| sort -count"
)
return search(service, query, earliest)
def detect_lateral_movement_smb(service, earliest="-24h"):
"""Detect SMB lateral movement via Type 3 logons to many hosts (T1021.002)."""
query = (
'index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 '
"| stats dc(ComputerName) as targets, values(ComputerName) as dest_hosts "
"by src_ip, TargetUserName "
"| where targets > 3 | sort -targets"
)
return search(service, query, earliest)
def detect_psexec(service, earliest="-24h"):
"""Detect PsExec execution via Sysmon process creation (T1021.002)."""
query = (
"index=sysmon EventCode=1 "
'(Image="*\\\\psexec.exe" OR Image="*\\\\psexesvc.exe" '
'OR ParentImage="*\\\\psexesvc.exe") '
"| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine"
)
return search(service, query, earliest)
def build_forensic_timeline(service, hostname, earliest, latest="now"):
"""Build a comprehensive forensic timeline for a host."""
query = (
f'(index=wineventlog OR index=sysmon) Computer="{hostname}" '
"| eval desc=case("
' EventCode=4624, "Logon: ".TargetUserName." (Type ".Logon_Type.")",'
' EventCode=4625, "Failed Logon: ".TargetUserName,'
' EventCode=1, "Process: ".Image," CMD: ".CommandLine,'
' EventCode=3, "Network: ".DestinationIp.":".DestinationPort,'
' EventCode=11, "File Created: ".TargetFilename,'
' EventCode=13, "Registry: ".TargetObject,'
' 1=1, "Event ".EventCode) '
"| sort _time | table _time, EventCode, desc, User, src_ip"
)
return search(service, query, earliest, latest)
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Windows Event Log Splunk Analysis Agent")
parser.add_argument("--host", default=os.getenv("SPLUNK_HOST", "localhost"))
parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=int(os.getenv("SPLUNK_PORT", "8089")))
parser.add_argument("--username", default=os.getenv("SPLUNK_USERNAME", "admin"))
parser.add_argument("--password", default=os.getenv("SPLUNK_PASSWORD", ""))
parser.add_argument("--earliest", default="-24h")
parser.add_argument("--hostname", help="Target hostname for timeline")
parser.add_argument("--action", choices=[
"brute_force", "password_spray", "new_admin", "lsass_access",
"lateral_smb", "psexec", "timeline", "full_hunt"
], default="full_hunt")
args = parser.parse_args()
svc = connect(args.host, args.port, args.username, args.password)
findings = {}
if args.action in ("brute_force", "full_hunt"):
findings["brute_force"] = detect_brute_force(svc, args.earliest)
print(f"[+] Brute force sources: {len(findings['brute_force'])}")
if args.action in ("password_spray", "full_hunt"):
findings["password_spray"] = detect_password_spray(svc, args.earliest)
print(f"[+] Password spray events: {len(findings['password_spray'])}")
if args.action in ("new_admin", "full_hunt"):
findings["new_admin"] = detect_new_admin_accounts(svc)
print(f"[+] New admin accounts: {len(findings['new_admin'])}")
if args.action in ("lsass_access", "full_hunt"):
findings["lsass_access"] = detect_lsass_access(svc, args.earliest)
print(f"[+] LSASS access events: {len(findings['lsass_access'])}")
if args.action in ("lateral_smb", "full_hunt"):
findings["lateral_smb"] = detect_lateral_movement_smb(svc, args.earliest)
print(f"[+] Lateral movement paths: {len(findings['lateral_smb'])}")
if args.action == "timeline" and args.hostname:
findings["timeline"] = build_forensic_timeline(svc, args.hostname, args.earliest)
print(f"[+] Timeline events: {len(findings['timeline'])}")
print(json.dumps({"generated_at": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(), "findings": findings}, indent=2, default=str))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()